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Abstract 
 
The parliamentary elections of 2005 in Poland brought the Law and Justice 
Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) into government. Its leaders Lech and 
Jarosław Kaczyńskis started an anti-Communist campaign that had the 
ideologically motivated purpose to rewrite the political narrative of the 
Communist times in Poland embracing and calling for a more pro-active ‘politics 
of history’. The aim of this paper is to analyze how this new “politics of history” 
was framed and implemented by the Polish government and to trace its influence 
on Polish public opinion concerning the Communist period. The study is 
theoretically framed by concepts of collective memory and its relationship with 
politics and power and empirically based on an analysis of party programs by the 
PiS, on public speeches as well as on survey data spanning the period from 2005 
to 2011. The data for the analysis of public opinion and perceptions will be taken 
from mainly two sources, (a) the freely available data provided by the Polish 
Public Opinion Centre (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - CBOS) as well as 
(b) from comments made by Polish citizens on the homepage of the PiS. Both 
give insight into the public perceptions of crucial issues relating to the Communist 
past such as lustration, vetting and remembrance and unveil a deeply divided 
society. The analysis concludes that whereas the PiS government certainly meant 
a radicalization of the political narrative of Communism (one of the ways in 
which the Communist era has been officially remembered), the public opinion 
polls do not demonstrate an immediate impact of the political campaign on the 
way people remember and assess the Communist past.  
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Introduction  
The memory of historical events has always provided a basis for disagreement 
among those who remember. This is due to the subjectivity of memory; every 
individual remembers differently and puts emphasis on different events. A nation 
consisting of individuals faces a particular challenge to agree on a common, 
national memory. A nation is forced to face the challenge and potentially even re-
invent its national memory in the case of political upheaval such as the collapse of 
the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989. At first, 
the newly independent states were preoccupied with their political and economic 
transition and were not concerned about creating a national memory of 
Communism. In Poland, it took several years until the political elite began to 
unify and rearrange their memory practices that had previously been rather diffuse 
and decentralized.1 Between 2004 and 2007, the Polish political party Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (PiS), which translates into “Law and Justice”, stated in several 
public statements that Poland did not have a political memory narrative of the 
Communist past.2 Political memory is the rather homogenous narrative provided 
by the political elites of past events and which serves as basis for national identity. 
The PiS is commonly classified on the political spectrum as conservative, center-
right-wing (Aronoff & Kupik 2013). They stand for economic nationalism, euro-
skepticism, a national community based on traditional values and social solidarity. 
The party slogan is Patryotizm - Solidarność - Nowoczesność (Patriotism – 
Solidarity - Modernity). The PiS’s leaders Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński spurred 
on a new discussion with rather propagandistic anti-Communist slogans. The 
background story of the attempt to change the political memory narrative by the 
Kaczyńskis is that Poland became a member of the European Union and, with 
that, experienced an extension of its identity. Before 2004, the aim of becoming a 
member of the EU, which entailed the completion of transformation to democracy 
and national sovereignty, united the national elites.3 When the goal was finally 
achieved in 2004, EU membership did no longer distract the political elites from 
internal rifts and disagreements with regard to the memory of the Communist past 
                                                            
1 Ruchniewicz (2009): p. 219 
2 Ruchniewicz (2009): p. 219  
3 Zhurzhenko (2007) 
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and of the transition period.4 Some remembered Communism as an oppressive 
system that was fought by the democratic opposition, whereas others present 
Communist Poland more positively and the transition as intended and contrived 
by the Communist Party itself. With the ambiguous narratives becoming overt, 
each side struggled to make their version the official narrative of Poland.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the political construction of memory from 
the agents’ perspective. Here, the agents to be analyzed are politicians and how 
they use certain understandings of the past to legitimize political actions and 
campaigns. In other words, it will be analyzed how politicians create particular 
historical images for political purposes. Moreover, it will be examined how and to 
what extent politicians affect the society’s perception of the past, using the 
example of Poland. Social perception is defined here as the way how the society, 
meaning the non-private sphere, sees and interprets a specified event. This thesis 
is a single case study and analyzes how the “Law and Justice” party (PiS) 
attempted to change the political narrative and how it influenced the public’s 
understanding of Communist Poland. After they had won the parliamentary 
elections in 2005, the PiS revived anti-Communist sentiments among parts of the 
political elite and started an aggressive campaign aiming at demonizing the 
Communist system. The title of the thesis is: Changing the official memory of 
Communism: Polish politics of memory under the Kaczyński brothers and its 
impact on social perceptions of the past.  
The novelty of this project lies in the temporal comparison of Polish 
memory construction before and during the Kaczyński brothers’ attempt at re-
defining Poland’s political memory. It gives new insight into Polish social opinion 
of the Communist past by examining direct quotes by Polish citizens on the 
Kaczyńskis’ campaign. Moreover, this thesis deepens the understanding of 
domestic political discourse in post-transitional Poland in particular and gains new 
insights into post-Communist memory construction in general. Public opinion 
polls are used as, however small measurement of social perceptions, which has 
been neglected in previous studies.  
Poland is a suitable case study, because it had one of the most protracted 
transitional justice processes and most severe disagreement among politicians on 
how to deal with the past. The debate was, especially in the 1990s, marked by 
                                                            
4 Zhurzhenko (2007)  
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controversies and conflict. During the first post-Communist administration, 
opposition forces called for lustration and worse forms of punishment against 
former Communists as political maneuver.5 A decade later, the Kaczyński 
brothers declared their aim “(…) to uproot the uklad, a supposed network of 
communist-era spies and their allies in business and the public services”.6 Anti-
Communist rhetoric has never gone out of fashion in Poland, which supplies the 
researcher with extensive and expressive data.  
The purpose of the study is to detect which images of Polish Communist times 
is being created during and after the PiS’s time in office. Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński are in the center of the analysis, because they were the leaders of the 
PiS, the forerunners of the anti-Communist campaign and rhetorically the most 
expressive ones. The following research questions are sought to be answered with 
this study.  
- What images of the Communist past are shaped by the PiS?  
- What are the major arguments, words, phrases and rhetorical tools used in 
the speeches given by Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński?  
- Is the Communist past still relevant for the Polish public and if so, to what 
extent?  
- Has public perception of the Communist era radicalized due to the PiS’s 
campaign?  
Answers to these questions will be pursued in two steps. First, a content 
analysis of political speeches and public statements given by the Kaczyńskis 
between 2005 and 2011 as well as PiS party programs will be conducted. Those 
dates were chosen, because their campaign started in 2005 and in 2011, the PiS 
had to face several internal issues including the formation of splinter parties, so 
that the anti-Communist campaign fell behind on their priority list. Second, data 
from public opinion polls carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre 
(Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej) will be used as basis for measuring whether 
there is a tangible change in direction in the public perception of the Communist 
past. Also, comments from Polish citizens on the homepage of the PiS will be 
taken into consideration in order to provide insight into the reactions of the people 
to the PiS’s new attempt at condemning the Communist era in Poland. The major 
                                                            
5 Raimundo (2012): p. 159 
6 The Economist (2007) 
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data sources for political speeches and statements will be Kronika Sejmowa. 
Kronika Sejmowa is the official journal of the Polish parliament published every 
two weeks and reports on decisions of the parliament and sub-bodies, conferences, 
and written correspondences with the EU parliament. The PiS’s homepage 
provides public access to party programs, interviews, party statements and 
speeches given by members of the PiS, mainly its leaders Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński.  
The thesis is structured as follows. In the literature and theory section of the 
thesis, the existing literature on political memory construction and party ideology 
will be reviewed and theories of collective memory will be discussed in order to 
understand after which pattern events are being remembered. The theoretical 
centerpiece of this thesis is political memory construction, also called politics of 
memory. The term politics of memory describes the political means by which 
events are being remembered and refers to how politics shape collective memory. 
The theory part will be followed by methodology, where the empirical procedure 
and operationalization will be explained in greater detail. Further on, the empirical 
data will be presented and analyzed. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.  
The most notable limitation lies in the methodological approach, according to 
which public opinion polls are used to measure public perception. Not all possible 
sources that show the opinion of the Polish people can be consulted. Also, it must 
be pointed out that the surveys are only one indicator out of numerous ones. The 
author does not claim that opinion polls show the whole truth, but is meant to give 
an insight into Polish perceptions of the Communist past. Concerning the 
comments of Polish citizens found on the PiS homepage, their representativeness 
is not suggested. Furthermore, the author recognizes that there are many layers of 
political memory, like politicians, different political institutions or non-
governmental organizations, but in this study only the political narrative of one 
major political actor, the political party ‘PiS’, will be analyzed. Another limitation 
is that the speeches do not cover the entire extent of the campaign, but rather show 
and analyze the motivation behind the Kaczyńskis’ campaign and the substance of 
their arguments. Due to the length of this paper, it is not possible to include the 
other aspects of the campaign such as the change in mandate of the parliament 
established Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej - 
IPN) or the attempt at implementing a new lustration law.  
9 
 
Chapter I: Theory and literature review  
The theoretical construct of politics of memory combines theories of political 
and social memory. The discussion of these theories is essential for the 
understanding of memory construction and its underlying patterns. The 
complexity of politics of memory is based on the connections of the theories are 
interlinked. However, the focus of this study lies on the linkage of political 
memory and social perception, which is part of the greater phenomenon of social 
memory. They describe different levels of memory. Political memory is a 
comprehensive term for political, national and cultural memory and refers to the 
creation of memory narratives by political agents.7 Social memory refers to the 
social dimension of memory. It analyzes social actors including individual, 
family, interactive group, and how they construct their memory narrative. In a 
democracy those two processes influence each other; social and political actors 
aim at changing the respective other’s narrative to fulfill their particular interests. 
Hence, social and political memory are connected and intertwined. The directions 
of influence are called top-down and bottom-up processes. Whereas the top-down 
process describes how political memory influences social memory, the bottom-up 
process refers to the opposite direction and explains in what way and to what 
extent social memory changes political memory. Only the top-down process will 
be of interest for this paper; the bottom-up process will not be discussed, except 
the dimension of social memory. Also, individual memory will not be 
conceptualized here. Neither are historical memory and legal justice procedures of 
interest for this paper.  
This chapter is subdivided into the aspects important for this research. First, the 
concept of collective – both social and political - memory will provide the 
theoretical basis. Collective memory must be detached from the idea of history.8 
Timothy Snyder’s approach is the most suitable, because he examined the issue in 
the light of Communism, on which this thesis centers. The difference between 
social and political memory, will be analyzed. Aleida Assmann’s approach has 
been chosen, because she focuses on the interaction of political and social 
memory, which is central to this study. Then, various theoretical approaches to 
politics of memory will be discussed. Next, power in relation to memory and 
                                                            
7 Compare with Onken (2010): p. 280, Figure 1  
8 Snyder (2004): p. 39 
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politics will be defined. Finally, the different aspects constituting the politics of 
memory will be conflated. The effects of power on memory will be analyzed on 
the basis of the classic power theorists Bacharach and Baratz (1962: 950) and their 
concept of “mobilization of bias”. This approach seems to be the most suitable 
one, since it deals with political myths and influence in politics, which is in the 
center of this thesis. The concepts and theories of memory are then brought into 
context of Polish post-Communist memory. This structure is considered the most 
useful one, because the complexity of the multi-dimensional construct of politics 
of memory is best understood when the different aspects of it and how they relate 
to each other are first comprehensively unraveled.   
 
1.1. Collective memory 
Memory is the subject of analysis in many fields such as psychology, 
sociology, politics, and history, which results in an unclear amount of different 
approaches. Collective memory has in the academic literature also been referred 
to as, among others, ‘social memory’ (Barry Schwartz 1982), ‘official memory’ 
(Henri Rousso 1991), ‘public memory’ (John Bodnar 1992), or ‘cultural memory’ 
(Jan Assmann & Aleida Assmann 2004). The approaches in memory studies are 
extremely diverse, but one of the most relevant traces back to Maurice Halbwachs 
in “Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire” (1925). He defined memory as a way of 
reconstructing the past. The American historian W. Fitzhugh Brundage agreed 
with Halbwachs and defined social memory as “organized, explicitly public 
representation of the past”.9 As student of the sociologist Émile Durkheim, 
Halbwachs was among the first to study how the social context influences and 
changes individual, as well as collective memory. He argued that memory is 
necessarily a social construct and it is for this reason that memory must change 
with the social context. Halbwachs contended that memory is flexible and 
interchangeable. Memory is replaced by another memory, depending on the social 
environment. Halbwachs rejected the notion of individual memory as an isolated 
concept. He argued that a single person is not capable of remembering outside the 
context of a social group. Frederick Bartlett (1932) also studied how society 
influences individual minds and, thus, memories. He thought along the lines of 
                                                            
9 Brundage (2000): p. 24 
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Halbwachs and maintained that people acquire, recall, recognize, and localize 
their memories in society. He, however, called collective memory “reconstructive 
memory”.10 Collective memory itself is rooted in the following two concepts: the 
first one is the organic memory of the individual that evolves out of a socio-
cultural environment. The second one is memory that is created through 
interaction, communication, media, and institutions within social groups, and 
cultural communities commonly relating to the past. However, scholars disagree 
whether or not the concepts of individual and collective memory are bridgeable, 
since individual memory is always affected by others and, hence, must be 
collective in some way.11 Maurice Halbwachs, among other scholars, argued that 
individual memory and collective memory are inseparable concepts. Individual 
memory is always influenced by the social and political environment and, thus, 
cannot be seceded from collective memory. In turn, collective memory is 
practiced by the individual.  
Following the tracks of Maurice Halbwachs, Aleida Assmann (2006) argues 
that social memory has a limited time frame (span of a lifetime), because it is 
created through social interaction and communication. This communication does 
not have to be personal, but can be transmitted through different kinds of media 
such as pictures, books, or diaries. She refers to Harald Welzer who said that 
social memory may not even be noticed or intentional, but rather is incidental and 
subliminal.12 Social memory is a “publicly available social fact” (Onken 2010: 
280) and is mediated through symbols, commemorative rituals, and practices. It 
provides a “sense of shared beliefs and values” (Onken 2010: 280), which is 
similar to the concept of public opinion, which also based on morals and 
convictions (beliefs). Ideology must be considered in the context of top-down 
processes of memory. The exact interrelations will be discussed in greater detail 
later on.   
History and collective memory are understood in the Halbwachsian sense 
as two conflicting ways of dealing with what is in the past. According to 
Halbwachs, “history starts when social memory and continuous tradition stop 
operating and dissolve”.13 From this perspective, social memory covers the time 
                                                            
10 Ost and Costall (2002) 
11 Lavenne (2010): p. 2 
12 Assmann (2006): pp. 28-29  
13 Holtorf (1998) 
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period that living people can remember. History, in contrast, has a much broader 
timeframe. Yet, the timely demarcation between living and disembodied memory 
seems to miss the main differences. This is why the strict distinction between 
history and memory has been challenged and a more imbricated approach has 
been suggested by scholars such as John Nerone (1989) and David Thelen (1989). 
Both consider it impossible to fully separate those concepts from each other and 
added further dimensions that separate history from memory. Also Pierre Nora 
vastly disagrees with Halbwachs’ argument. Nora (1989: 8) said that memory is 
alive in the living, whereas history the reconstruction of the past, is never easy or 
complete. History is the past organized and made sense of by historians. It is more 
based on facts and details, rather than myths. Whereas historians make the attempt 
to reveal indisputable historical facts, collective memories have room for differing 
views on the past. Alternatively, history is committed to facts; memory, in 
contrast, serves a purpose and changes with it.  
Timothy Snyder (2004) conceptualizes collective memory and history and 
provides a comprehensive differentiation. First, Snyder (2004: 39) differs between 
“mass personal memory” and “the organisational principle that nationally 
conscious individuals use to organise the national history”. The latter is, in 
contrast to the former, organized and less scattered. He says that, although history 
is a prerequisite of memory, they are separable concepts. Generally speaking, 
history presents past events as facts, whereas memory is the perception and 
interpretation of the past. Historical facts are the result of research and retrospect 
and are devoted to the highest possible amount of objectivity. Memory, on the 
other hand, is more subjective compared to history. The variety of memory 
derives from the differing conceptions of past events of groups such as victims, 
bystanders, or perpetrators. Memory as a whole embodies memories of all sides 
from all available sources. Timothy Snyder adds another important dimension, 
which he calls “sovereignty over memory”. The concept of sovereignty over 
memory means the precedence of future endeavors over the claims of the past. He 
understands “memory not as individual recollections, not as a collective 
phenomenon, nor as a reaction to communism, but as a political problem which 
could be addressed in a future independent Poland by political means”14. In order 
to carry on with the future, the past must first be understood. With the words of 
                                                            
14 Snyder (2004): p. 55 
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former German President Richard Weizäcker: “Who closes the eyes for the past, 
becomes blind for the future”15. However, if the past dictates something else than 
the future does, the demands of the future must be followed. For example, the 
preservation of national sovereignty for the future is more important than 
reclaiming what has been lost in the past. Hence, memory has not only political 
implications; it mainly is a political issue. This observation leads to the notion of 
the politics of memory.  
 
1.2.  Politics of memory 
When we talk about memory in the political context, it needs to be noted 
that politics of memory is not a concept as such. It rather is a complex construct 
that combines numerous aspects and theories from different disciplines. Before 
the construct in itself can be conceptualized, a differentiation between “politics of 
memory” and “the political in memory” must be made. Tzvetan Todorov (2000) is 
one of the scholars who developed a comprehensive definition of both concepts 
and explained their innate characteristics. The “politics of memory” and “the 
political in memory” are two separated, yet connected concepts. The former 
signifies the act of creating a collective memory through institutions, political acts 
and public discourses. The latter points to how memory is manipulated as a 
political means. The political in memory also refers to constant change that 
memory is subject to. Politics of memory resemble a process of constant re-
considering of the past as a result of social and political change. Politics are 
supposed to stabilize, but memory functions as a wrenching counterforce. 
Todorov also argued that the politics of memory is never neutral: events are 
always directed, they are never presented equally. Some are shown and 
highlighted and others are kept aside.  
The political construction of memories has different dimensions that need 
to be distinguished and defined. First, the official and unofficial construction of 
memory needs to be distinguished. Although official and unofficial, also called 
popular16, memories are defined in their own lines; they are not entirely separable 
since they interact with each other. The difference between official and unofficial 
                                                            
15 Stolzmann (2012). The original says (1985): „Wer vor der Vergangeheit die Augen verschließt, wird blind für 
die Gegenwart“.  
16 Yow (2005): p. 54 
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memory is mainly defined by the initiator. Official memory is created by, among 
others, governmental institutions, parties, or military and religious elites, whereas 
unofficial memory is shaped by civil agents. Alon Confino (1997: 1393) wrote in 
“Collective memory and cultural history: Problems of method” that memory is 
subjective17 and provides power, because a social group, such as the political elite, 
decides what is remembered how, why, and by whom. Valerie Yow (2005: 54) 
argues against it and states that popular memory, in opposition to official memory, 
is shared by a group of people who do not inevitably possess power. The tools to 
form official memory can be, for instance, historical textbooks, public speeches, 
transitional justice policies, and commemorative acts such as public holidays. The 
unofficial construction of memory, on the other hand, includes artistic productions 
such as movies or books and other socially produced actions.  
Political memory is “a form of structural power that works through radical 
selection and simplification, high symbolic intensity and emotional appeal” 
(Onken 2010: 280). The tools used to create and control public memory that is 
conform to a certain political direction are, among others, history education, 
public commemoration including, for example, national holidays, and museums. 
Onken (2010: 282-284) differentiates between four types of memory agents. 
Those types differ in their awareness of their memory role, which Onken (2010: 
282) refers to as “memory consciousness”. They are also distinct in their amount 
of social capital and the ability to mobilize it. Social capital is, according to 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to 
an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”.18 This 
distinction is useful to show the plurality of the very diverse memory actors and 
represent heterogeneity of memory narrative debate due to the pluralistic and 
liberal nature of democracies (Onken 2010: 286). However, types 1 through 3 are 
irrelevant for this thesis, since they describe societal actors and their influence on 
the political memory (bottom-up process). Type 4 refers to the political and 
intellectual elites such as politicians, journalists or artists. They are called the 
interpretative elite (Deutungselite) and have the monopoly on the nation’s 
narrative.  
                                                            
17 There is disagreement among scholars about the subjectivity of memory. Pierre Nora, for instance, agrees with 
Alon Confino, but Aleida Assmann argues against it.   
18 In: Claridge (2004) 
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Aleida Assmann (2006: 37) refers to national memory as an aspect of political 
remembering. National memory is constituent for the identity of a nation and, 
thus, there can only be one perspective or interpretation of the past, which, in turn, 
is official memory. A nation’s memory is not analytical and based on a rather 
selective set of facts; it is, on the contrary, mythologized. Myths, in the context of 
national memory, are understood as not falsified, but rather simplified narratives 
that serve the purpose to create loyalties among the people. Assmann expresses it 
in this way: history is heightened to a myth (2006: 40). In other words, myths are 
the interpretations of historical experiences, altered in order to create a national 
identity. They are subject to change and are constantly replaced by other myths. 
She also points out that myths are based on either major defeats and capitulations 
or great victories. In short, it is “triumph and trauma”19. Those defeats and 
victories are being celebrated or mystified through monuments, sacred places, and 
memorials. All defeats or victories necessarily stand in relation to the significant 
other (‘them’). In other words, political memory “tends towards homogenous 
unity”20. The others can either be different ethnicities or alien nations. Closely 
connected to the antagonism of trauma and triumph is the differentiation between 
the two concepts of the memory of victims (“victim identity”21) and of the 
memory of perpetrators. Choosing a glorious victory or a major, traumatic defeat 
as basis for the creation of national memory and identity defines whether a nation 
has a victim or a perpetrator identity. Applying the two previous points to the 
Polish case, it can be stated that the Kaczyńskis and the PiS are trying to create a 
memory of victimization, but the issue at hand is that the perpetrator (“the other”) 
is part of the nation and, hence, cannot be excluded from national memory. In the 
case of Communist Poland, the definition of the other is not easy. As Kazimierz 
Michał Ujazdowski, the Minister of Culture and National Heritage and member of 
the PiS, said:  
“Communism was an alien force, the force turned against the 
independence of the Republic and it is difficult to free, independent, 
democratic and respecting its tradition of honoring the country for the 
                                                            
19 Assmann (2002): p. 28 
20 Assmann (2002): p. 26  
21 Assmann (2002): p. 27 
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possibility of people who clearly and blatantly were advocates of 
Poland's foreign and destructive ideology”.22  
On the one hand, Communism is considered a foreign force, which led to a 
memory of victim or even martyrdom in Poland, but, on the other hand, the PiS’s 
campaign is directed against the domestic political opposition. When it comes to 
Communist times in Poland and how it is remembered, “the other” comes in form 
of a different ethnicity or of an inimical nation. Of course one could argue that 
Russia is blamed for most of it, but as much as the Kaczyńskis rampage against 
Russia, their campaign is directed towards domestic opponents.  
It is important to understand the dynamics of and differences between social 
memory and political memory. Social memory is determined to a large extent by 
political memory through the exercise of political power, although it changes due 
to numerous other factors. The characteristics of political and social memory 
differ in the following way. In political memory, a rather straight narrative 
prevails and only the most important events are being remembered. Social 
memory, on the other hand, is vastly based on individual memory and therefore 
very diverse and diffuse. Social and political memory may consider different 
events relevant and worth remembering. In her paper “Four formats of memory”, 
Aleida Assmann (2002: 23-24) says that “the change of generations is paramount 
for the renewal and reconstruction of societal memory”. But a change in societal 
discourse and, subsequently, a transformation of social memory can as well be 
reached within a generation.23 Tragic events that cause national traumas such as, 
for example, the plane crash near Smolensk when Lech Kaczyński and other 
members of the political and military elite of Poland died in 2010 may also initiate 
the creation of new national memories. If we compare political and social memory 
on the basis of their pace of transformation, it becomes obvious that they differ 
significantly. While social memory changes with generations, a different political 
memory may result from a new government. Hence, it is argued here that 
alterations, if not in the overall, in certain aspects of the social and political 
memory do necessarily not happen parallel due to their different paces and 
different agents. Therefore, they do not instantly influence each other, but instead 
affect each other with some delay. Also, social and political memory change due 
                                                            
22 30.03.2007 | Wywiady (Interviews) | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007) | Źródło (Source): Polish Radio Pr 1. 
PiS website.  
23 Assmann (2002): p. 24 
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to different factors. Governments may amend national memory, but are unlikely to 
change it entirely, even if they are in power for a considerable amount of time. 
National memory is simplified and, therefore, quite constant. Noteworthy 
literature contributions on agents to try to control and influence memory and 
perceptions of the past have been made by scholars such as Brüggemann & 
Kasekamp 2008, Onken 2003, Petersoo & Tamm 2008.  
Coming back to the idea of ideology, one needs to remember the relationship 
between changing social discourses, practices and expectations. Due to its 
changeable and flexible character, memory can be formed for political purposes. 
Depending on a certain ideology, memory can be manipulated. Patrick J. Geary 
(1994) mentioned that each and every form of memory is always made for 
something. It may have the purpose of creating a national identity or may be used 
politically. When memory is used in politics, it is subjected to ideology and is 
exploited for political aims. Most scholars carefully avoid the word manipulation 
when they talk about “influencing the collective memory”24 of a social group, 
because influence is more neutral and less negatively connoted than manipulation. 
Nevertheless, manipulation is not necessarily inaccurate. Depending on how and 
to what extent collective memory is influenced to serve political purposes, one can 
say that memory is politically manipulated. Geary (1994: 12) argues that history is 
presented in an analytical and rational way, whereas memory is formable through 
rhetorical tools: “If the writing of modern historians appears analytic, critical, and 
rational, the reason is that these are the rhetorical tools that promise the best 
chance of influencing the collective memory of our age”. Gildea (1994) goes 
along the lines of Geary when he argues that “policy goals have a decisive 
influence on how memory is constructed” (quoted by Müller 2004: 59). 
Politicians and the intellectual elite create the national identity by interpreting the 
past in a particular way. Those interpretations, in turn, serve as legitimizations for 
policy decisions. Gildea claims that history is constantly rewritten in order to 
justify their political initiatives and decisions. Correspondingly, Henry Rousso 
presents in detail the many ways of how memory is used for political objectives.25 
As much as political memory attempts to create a congruent national narrative, 
there is always room for different interpretations of the past. Disagreement over 
                                                            
24 Geary (1994): p. 12 
25 In: Confino (1997): p. 1394 
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how the past is being remembered goes along ideological lines. Ideology falsifies 
and manipulates the memory of historical events. In other words, memory is 
relative in the sense that the perception of past events is dictated by ideology. In 
Poland, the division of political memory goes along party lines; whereas the 
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokraticznej - SLD), a post-
Communist party, wants to remember communism positively, the PiS, a post-
Solidarność party, aims at a negative interpretation of history. The division that 
exists in Polish political memory equals the division in social memory between 
those who accuse and condemn Communism and those who do not. Subsequently, 
the question arises to what extent those strains of collective memory can differ. 
Interpretations of history can only be made in the framework of historical facts. 
Also, what are the differences and what are the congruities of the memories 
suggested by the different parties? Do their views on the Communist past actually 
differ to a measureable amount? After all, Poland’s major parties share the 
rejection of Communism as a political option.  
 
1.3. Political power  
Herbert Goldhammer and Edward Shils agree on defining power as “the 
ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one's own ends”26, 
based on Joseph Nye’s definition, according to which power is “the ability to 
achieve one’s purposes and goals”27. The complexity of the concept of power, 
however, is that it has numerous dimensions. The most profound and prominent 
distinction was made by Bacharach and Baratz (1962). They claimed that power 
has two faces, on one of which political scientists focus on: the exercise of power. 
They add the dimension of what they call the “dynamics of non-decision-
making”, which sees power not only as violent force, but also as tool to prevent 
conflicts.28 Talcott Parsons followed this distinction and pointed out that power is 
always exercised against some sort of resistance and that augmentation of power 
in one actor necessarily results in the loss of power in the respective other. This 
brings Parson close to the realist approach to power. What differentiates him from 
                                                            
26 Goldhammer and Shils (1937): p. 171 
27 Nye (1990): pp. 25-26 
28 Bacharach & Baratz (1962): p. 952 
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Morgenthau, among others, is that he separates coercive form consensual power. 
It is understood that coercive power is equal to force or the threat thereof. 
Consensual power, on the other hand, describes the act of convincing someone to 
want the same as oneself does. However, power should not be confused with 
influence. Influence, in contrast to power, is the attempt of persuasion, which, 
however, is not necessarily effective.  
The above mentioned includes the essential understanding of the concept of 
power in social and political sciences. Relevant for this thesis, however, is the 
dimension of bias, introduced by Bacharach and Baratz. The so-called 
“mobilization of bias” means that “the dominant values and the political myths, 
rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more 
groups, relative to others”.29 In other words, influential actors control political 
agendas according to their respective interests; some issues are stressed, some are 
dropped. Cristian Tileagặ (2012) argues that, when it comes to historical justice, 
the aim of political elites is not necessarily about interpreting the diverse 
meanings of Communism, but rather how it can serve their political desires and 
goals. Collective memory construction and political power relate to the Polish 
case study in the sense that the Kaczyńskis try to reshape the political memory by 
reviving the topic of lustration. The aspect of “mobilization of bias” is important 
for this particular study of Polish politics of memory, because the Kaczyńskis’ 
anti-Communist campaign starting in 2005 appears in a different light, when 
mobilization of bias is considered. The question arises why the Kaczyńskis chose 
to prioritize memory politics over other topics on the agenda. Possible answers 
will be given in the section ‘The PiS and politics of history: Background’.  
To sum up, politics of memory describes how political memory influences 
social memory through power politics. Power politics are the tool to change the 
current and prevalent political narrative of history. This can only be done due to 
the flexibility of memory. This shows that the representations of history, however, 
are not necessarily committed to the truth and historical facts, but are subject to 
political interests and influenced by party ideology.  
 
                                                            
29 Bacharach & Baratz (1962): p. 950 
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Chapter II: Methodology 
Research will be conducted after the following scheme in order to test the 
theory that is described above. Contemporary speeches and official documents 
from the PiS and particularly from the Kaczyński brothers related to the Soviet 
past will be examined to show how they are trying to alter the perception of the 
Communist past and use of memory as a populist tool. After all, it was mainly 
Lech and Jarołsaw Kaczyński who introduced and shaped the historical narrative 
in Poland between 2005 and after. Data will be collected from key policy 
documents concerning or mentioning the Communist past and political speeches 
given in the Sejm and in public by party representatives. The pool of data is 
limited to parliamentary debates and party programs. The dependent variable is 
‘public opinion’. The independent variable is ‘Kaczyński’s anti-Communist 
rhetoric’. A content analysis of the speeches and documents will be conducted to 
retrieve expressive data. Certain words and phrases indicate how history is 
remembered in the present day discourse. Hence, key policy documents will be 
analyzed for their language and narrative patterns. Special attention will be paid to 
a possible ideological subtext that is supposed to influence and manipulate the 
public-political discourse in favor of the speaker. Access to the relevant 
documents is provided by the online archives of the Polish Parliament Kronika 
Sejmowa. Kronika Sejmowa is the official journal of the Polish parliament 
published every two weeks and reports on decisions of the parliament and sub-
bodies, conferences, and written correspondences with the EU parliament. 
Another important source is the homepage of the PiS (www.pis.org.pl), where 
political documents are available to the public as well.  
In order to measure the effects of the Kaczyńskis’ populism on the Polish 
public opinion, both the period before and during their time in office must be 
taken into consideration and compared with each other. The relevant timeframe is 
1994 until the present day. 1994 was chosen as a starting point, because that year 
accessible and representative data was first collected and right after the collapse 
discourse was only secondary after political and economic transition. More 
importantly, though, in 1997 Poland’s new constitution was adopted marking the 
end of the political transition. The second phase started with the ‘return to Europe’ 
or EU membership. 2011 is considered a suitable endpoint, because the era of the 
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Kaczyński brothers ended with Lech Kaczyński’s death in a plane crash in 
Smolensk and retreated from the political center stage. Also, the Communist past 
still played a role in the 2011 Party Program. Moreover, comments made by 
Polish citizens on the homepage of PiS will also be taken into account. They are 
meant to show what rather right-wing oriented Poles think about the Kaczyńskis’ 
anti-Communist campaign. Those comments will provide more specific insight 
into what some parts of the Polish society think about the new lustration attempt 
of the PiS. It is probable that the interest among politicians as well as in the 
society in the Communist era and how to deal with its heritage is deteriorating.  
 
1.1. Operationalization  
In order to empirically evaluate the political speeches, a text content analysis 
will be conducted. It is considered to be the best approach, because it is the most 
common when in the context of political text study. However, content analysis is 
a general term that includes several different approaches, only two of which will 
be used.  
According to Hofstetter (1981), the behavior of public figures such as 
politicians and historical personalities is in the center of content analysis. Klaus 
Krippendorff’s “Content Analysis: An introduction to its methodology” (2003) is 
the standard work for researchers dealing with text analysis. He differentiates 
between qualitative and quantitative content analysis. A combination of the two 
approaches will be applied to the primary text sources. Whereas the qualitative 
method focuses on the subtext of a text, the quantitative style measures the 
frequency of specific words and how they are spread throughout the text. 
Analyzing words such as “Communism” and the regularity of their appearance is 
a quantitative method. Connecting those words to a meaning and analyzing 
underlying connotation, however, is qualitative.  
The qualitative approach can be followed after three independent schemes; 
directive, conventional, or summative. The directive method is most commonly 
used in the political field and is comparative in its core. Different documents 
about a particular legislation or policy are linked to each other along the lines of 
predefined aspects. The conventional approach, however, collects data through 
qualitative interviews with open ended questions. Finally, the summative style is 
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both quantitative and qualitative in nature. It is quantitative in the sense that 
certain words are looked for in a text and their usage explored. It is qualitative 
insofar that the usage of those words is interpreted and given a meaning. For this 
thesis, the directive and the summative method will be combined.  
In content analysis, language is the medium to deliver a message in the 
political context. When texts are used to provide data, the following method after 
Grimmer and Stewart (2013) appears applicable. Seven steps need to be followed 
when conducting a content analysis of political data. First, suitable and relevant 
documents need to be acquired. Those are most commonly, legal documents and 
bills, party statements, or written speeches. The next step is preprocessing, which 
includes making a list of relevant words, abolishing word order, punctuation, 
capitalization and the like. Also, the words are cut to their stems, endings 
indicating adjectives or past tense, for example, are not in the researcher’s interest. 
Further on, the research objectives are defined. Those criteria may either be 
sampling, recording, or context units.30 Those objectives are classified after 
known and unknown categories. The relevant material will then be gathered. The 
collected information is, as a next step, classified according to those criteria and 
treated like numerical data. The underlying danger at this stage is that it is 
statistically manipulative. Also, ideological scaling plays an important role at this 
stage. To measure the degree of ideological bias, the speeches will be submitted to 
a fact check. A fact is any kind of statement that can be verified.31 Fact-checking, 
therefore, describes the act of verifying all the facts in a manuscript.32 In order to 
do so, claims made in the speeches will be compared to facts given by historians 
and available in history books. Eventually, the data will be analyzed. Finally, 
conclusions will be drawn.  
All the previous steps describe the process from gathering significant 
documents to subjecting them to statistical techniques. A major issue that already 
occurs at an early stage is the amount of texts. Too few documents are not 
sufficient to satisfy empirical requirements, whereas too many make it impossible 
to carry out the study due to lack of time. With the so-called dictionary method 
the undertone of key words is studied. The researcher’s task is to figure out 
whether a word is positively or negatively connoted. Dictionaries are helpful in 
                                                            
30 Hofstetter (1981)  
31 Flynn (2005) 
32 Flynn (2005) 
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performing this job. However, context must be considered, since words may have 
different connotations in dissimilar settings.  
According to Lasswell’s classic communication model (1948), the content 
researcher studies the sender, content, medium, recipient, as well as the effects of 
communication. The sender is the source of communication. Information about 
the sender is important to understand possible intentions and manipulations of the 
communication through the sender. For instance, political actors may shape their 
text to achieve a certain goal. Different methods of persuasion are summarized 
under the terms logos, ethos, and pathos. An argument using logos aims at 
appealing to the audience’s reason. Ethos refers to ethics and can be thought of as 
attempt at convincing of the trustworthiness of the person making the argument. 
Pathos appeals to the emotions and the sympathetic imagination, as well as to 
beliefs and values. The content shows the characteristics of the message that has 
been sent. However, not only the amount of words is relevant, but also and 
foremost the meaning of it. Bias is a major concern at this point. The message 
needs a medium with which it can get from the sender to the receiver. Those 
media can be words transmitted through radio, television, or newspapers or the 
message can also be sent through pictures. How those messages are sent is not the 
single important aspect, but also how its content changes, is analyzed in content 
analysis. Discourse analysis helps to understand the effects of a message sent. The 
message is studied according to its grammar, word and sentence structure, and 
context, among others. Here, history and socio-psychological aspects play an 
important role.  
The validation issue can ideally be dealt with by dividing the data sets into 
three subsets. Slapin and Proksch (2008) suggest several and substance centered 
assessments. In order to assure validity, social, cultural and audience indicators 
need to be compared. Therefore, analysis results must be put into context of 
audience perceptions and behavioral effects.33 Information about all the 
previously mentioned levels of communication must be acquired to interpret a text 
as accurately and realistic as possible. All in all, the content analyst studies the 
intentions of the sender, the perception and intellectual processing of the recipient 
and, finally, the cultural and social context in which the communication takes 
place.  
                                                            
33 Krippendorff (1980): p. 23 
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1.2. Public opinion polls 
In sociology, opinions are measured through public opinion polls. The opinion 
survey claims to represent transparently the accurate tendencies of the public (i.e. 
Panagia, 2006). The two main issues that researchers have to face when 
conducting opinion poll surveys are the problem of induction and the one of 
validity. A rather small sample of individuals is representative for the relevant 
social group. Choosing a representative group of individuals is a challenge that 
social researchers tackle with statistical techniques such as randomness. The other 
important issue is validity – ontological and predictive validity.34 Ontological 
validity describes the concern of mirroring the real, established views of the 
society. Predictive validity relies on the survey’s capability to make a prediction 
on the outcome of elections and policy responsiveness. Rather high levels of 
policy responsiveness can be found, which means that public policies often reflect 
public opinion as represented by polls (i.e. Brooks & Manza 2006). The most 
commonly used statistical technique is the so-called probability sampling 
(Hallahan, 2010). The basic idea of probability samplings is randomness. Polls are 
used to make scientific, general statements about attitudes and likely actions of the 
members of a social group. If the same survey is conducted repeatedly with a 
reasonable time span, changes in the results can express shifts and trends in public 
opinion. Public opinion polls are indispensable to determine the effects of public 
relations campaigns.   
It is argued here that the data retrieved from the CBOS opinion polls provide 
an indication, however minor, for the much broader concept of social memory. 
Social memory expresses itself in numerous ways like it is influenced by various 
factors. One way of how it is revealed and, hence, can be measured, is public 
opinion polls. Other, more symbolic, signifiers of social memory are, for instance, 
national holidays, commemorative manifestations, declarations, charters, history 
textbooks, biographies, as well as art and fiction.35 By defining public memory as 
memory available in the public sphere, the state gets the role of an engineer of 
social memory.36 The connection between public memory and public opinion is 
that they are not only both part of the public sphere, they are even mutually 
                                                            
34 Perrin (2011) 
35 Blagojević (2012) 
36 Universiteit Leiden (2008) 
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determent. As Edward Casey (2004: 24) argues, social memory contributes, 
together with individual and collective memory, to public memory. Thereby, 
social memory becomes part of public memory and the public itself. Das (1972), 
however, studied the opposite direction - how public memory influences social 
memory. He claims that public memory is momentary in its nature; it comes and 
is eventually replaced by another. Yet, if it remains due to its social usefulness, it 
becomes social memory.37 Bogajević proves the connection of public opinion by 
stating that “[t]he choice of events that become objects of public attention, 
evaluative meanings they reflect, the public interest in selecting precisely these 
events rather than some others and, finally, ongoing and competing politics of 
social memory decisive for constructing present-day national identity”.38 In other 
words, events that make it into the public consciousness are constantly evaluated 
and eventually become social memory. An important observation is that public 
memory, and with it social memory, is created through ongoing interchange of 
ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and opinions – public opinions.39  
Public memory is connected to public opinion in the sense that public memory 
provides the social context in which we form our opinions. After all, public 
memory starts as public opinion, and public opinion, in turn, gets shaped in 
society, where rivaling opinions and perspectives contend for supremacy.40 Jeffrey 
K. Olick (2007) pointed out that social memory is shaped by social, economic, 
and political circumstances as well as by beliefs, values, opposition and 
resistance. He considers it an interaction of worldviews. Public memory, in turn, 
is manifested in public opinion and, hence, can be measured through public 
opinion polls. Therefore, political, socio-cultural, and discursive circumstances 
make social memory a public affair.  
Opinion polls are a legitimate indicator for social memory, because they reflect 
the ambiguity and diversity of social memory that is seldom without 
contradictions, especially in the context of Communism in Poland. Surveys also 
take into account the flexible character and the presumption that social memory is 
under permanent construction of social memory by conducting the same poll 
repetitively over a certain period of time. Hence, a comparative, temporary 
                                                            
37 Das (1972): p. 223 
38 Blagojević (2012) 
39 Casey (2004): p. 30  
40 Mackowski (2011) 
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dimension will be added. It will be studied how the answers to the same question 
have changed from one year to another. In order to measure alterations in the 
public perception before and during the Kaczyński era, surveys conducted in 2000 
and 2009, for instance, will be applied on the analysis.  
  
 
1.3 Empirical data  
Public opinion polls are included in the analysis to show whether or not 
the anti-Communist campaign of the Kaczyńskis had any effect on the Polish 
social perception. They are relevant and expressive, because they ask specifically 
about the issues the Kaczyńskis aimed at changing the memory of. The opinion 
polls are chosen according to their relevance to the topic. The polls show the 
general attitude of the Poles and reflect possible contradictory or ambiguous 
opinions of the Communist past.  
The survey data has been obtained from the Warsaw based Centrum 
Badania Opinii Społecznej (Public Opinion Research Center - CBOS). The center 
conducts public opinion polls on political and social issues and publishes them on 
their website www.cbos.pl. The data is available to the public in both Polish and 
English. CBOS is a non-profit organization, although their work is supervised by 
members of the Sejm, the Senate, the Prime Minister, and the President of the 
Republic. The research of the Centre is based on surveys carried out in the years 
between 1994 and 2009. Their chosen design was a random address sample. On a 
nation-wide basis, 1000 or 1500-adults were questioned to receive representative 
data. The questions in these surveys ask specifically about opinions about and 
attitudes towards the Communist past. The results of the following opinion polls 
are included in the analysis: Have the changes taking place in Poland since 1989 
brought people more gains or losses? Connected to this was the question: In what 
way have the following changed since 1989: a) Our relations with other countries, 
b) Polish economy, c) politics, d) your town/village, e) relations between the 
authorities and people? This particular survey was carried out in 1994, 1997, and 
1998 and, therefore, shows trends in the general attitude among the Polish 
population towards the Communist era. Another survey on evaluation and 
judgment of Communist Poland was conducted in 2000 and 2009 and will serve 
as argument later on in the analysis section.  
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The survey conducted in 1994, in 1996, in 1997, in 1999, in 2002 and, lastly, in 
2005 was directed towards policy measures related to vetting and de-
Communization: Should vetting be performed in Poland now, i.e. should it be 
checked whether the persons who occupy important positions in the state 
authorities collaborated with the Communist special services in the past? What do 
you think about de-Communization in Poland? Should persons occupying high 
positions in the former Communist Party and officers of the Communist Special 
Services be excluded from public service in the government, local government, 
foreign service, state-owned companies and the public media or not? The polls 
show only marginal changes in the Polish public opinion and a continuation of 
contrasting attitudes among the Poles.    
 
Chapter III: Analysis 
According to Aleks Szczerbiak (2003), the political memory in Poland has 
always been characterized by a polarization depending on the ideological attitudes 
towards the Communist past, with lustration and de-Communization being central 
elements of the disputes.41 In other words, post-Communist Poland was 
dominated by contrasting and competing political interpretations of and how to 
reckon with the past. The ideological cleavages ran between the center-right wing 
and the leftist political spectrum, which will be discussed in greater detail later on. 
Lustration and de-Communization are means to achieve justice in transitional 
countries just as legal prosecutions, memorials, or lustration policies. Lustration 
policies serve to clean the political system from the previous one and to restore 
credibility and legitimization for the new regime. In Poland, lustration is 
commonly understood as detecting whether or not an occupant of or candidate for 
a particular post, primary for the state, has in the past worked for or has 
collaborated with the Communist security services.42 De-Communization, in 
comparison, refers to “the removal and exclusion of people from office for having 
been functionaries of the Communist party or related institutions”.43 The actions 
that were taken with the intention of de-Communization included removing Soviet 
                                                            
41 In: Raimundo: p. 162 
42 Williams, Szczerbiak, Fowler (2003): p. 4  
43 Williams, Szczerbiak, Fowler (2003): p. 4  
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monuments, changing street names that, allegedly or not, glorify Communism 
and/or the Soviet Union, and the foundation of the Institute of National 
Remembrance (IPN) in 1998. The IPN is an institution established by the Polish 
Parliament (Sejm) with the purpose to prosecute crimes committed against the 
Polish nation and is, hence, one of the creators of memory and agents to achieve 
(post-) transitional justice through its legislative power. However, there was a lack 
of any symbolic acknowledgement of the end of Communist rule in the form of 
nationally celebrated holidays.44 Other terms that are used in the context of 
dealing with the Communist past and need to be explained are vetting and 
screening. Those two processes are similar, however not the same. Whereas 
screening only describes background checks, defined as formal and thorough 
examination, vetting results additionally in the exclusion from public office of 
those individuals who have a proven association with the past.45 The Polish 
process of dealing with the past and its different phases through which Poland 
went will be shown shortly to provide the historical background. The previous 
sections dealt with the construction of memory, but in this part, the content of the 
narrative will be discussed.   
 
 
1.1. The four phases of memory politics in transitional Poland 
Samuel Huntington stated that Eastern Germany and Romania were the only 
countries that had pursued transitional justice after the collapse of their respective 
Communist regimes. The others, in contrast, had followed a policy of “forgive-
and-forget”.46 The latter also accounts for Poland during the period of transition, 
yet not for the time following the finalization thereof. Filipa Raimundo (2012) 
called this new phase, in which previous settlements and the forgive-and-forget 
policy were challenged and justice demanded, “post-transitional justice”; Poland 
could no longer be considered post-Communist after the completion of economic 
and political transition and their return to Europe, marked by the EU accession.  
Scholars most commonly divide the process of post-Communist lustration and 
vetting in Poland into four phases. The first phase (1989 - 1993) is best described 
                                                            
44 Ochmann (2013) 
45 Stan (2006): p. 2  
46 In: Williams, Szczerbiak, Fowler (2003): p. 5  
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by the term “gróba linia”, most commonly translated into “thick line”, introduced 
by the first post-Communist Prime Minister of Poland Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The 
Communist past was supposed to remain part of the past and should not further 
have an effect on present politics. Moreover, Poland had no explicit lustration 
policy or made any attempt to come clean with the past. Although the government 
passed a lustration law in 1990, ensuring that police officers and prosecutors 
involved in repressing opposition activity would be excluded from their work, it 
was too soft to be considered an actual attempt at justice. This is the reason why 
the 1990s in Poland are by scholars like Ewa Ochmann (2013) referred to as the 
years of collective amnesia.  
The second phase started when the severe conflict between the ones contended 
with the reckoning of the past and those who say that more needs to be done 
becoming more and more apparent in the years between 1993 and 1997. The 
cleavage runs along the lines of the anti-revisionist post-Communist and the 
revisionist post-Solidarność parties. Hence, political party bias decided over the 
interpretation of the past. The SLD, for instance, is an example for a party 
emerging from old Communist parties. The PiS, on the other hand, is one of the 
successor parties of the Solidarność. The outbreak of conflict was most likely 
triggered by the victory of the post-Communist SLD party in the 1993 
parliamentary elections that appalled the revisionists. The revisionists were in 
favor of background checks and removing people from public office who were 
proven to have served the Communist regime. They demanded public punishment 
for all collaborators, the opening of archives and a more drastic lustration law. 
One of the most prominent representatives of the revisionists was Jan Olszewski, 
Vice Chairman of the Solidarność and third Prime Minister of Poland. He voted 
for a more radical lustration and de-Communization. They argued that “the truth 
will free us”47 and that the lack of lustration will keep Poland from becoming a 
fully democratized state. The anti-revisionist group, on the other side, sounded a 
note of caution and argued that archives would not provide complete reliability 
and would have the potential to destroy lives and could be used to arbitrarily 
discredit public figures.48 The political atmosphere of post-Communist Poland has 
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been infiltrated with detestation, which more and more mirrored the various 
frustrations of the new political class with the alleged lack of justice.49  
Poland entered a new, third phase in 1997 by implementing the first legal 
document concerning lustration that the government could agree on. Yet, the law 
was quite ineffective and only addressed the old Communist state security 
agencies, leaving the ruling parties, the military, and the counter-intelligence 
services unaffected.   
Scholars such as Adam Czarnota say that in 2001 a new phase started with 
elections that brought the post-Communists back into the government. President 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski submitted a proposal that called for “limiting the range 
of lustrable offenses and restricting the powers of the lustration agency”.50 The 
lustration law was adopted in September 2002. The law was further amended in 
2006, when the anti-Communist parties Law and Justice (PiS) and The League of 
Polish Families (LPR) were governing. The 2006 amendment covered a wider 
range of people than the lustration law of 1997 and applied to journalists, teachers, 
academics, and state company executives, to name a few.51  
 
 
1.2. The political narratives before 2005 
In order to understand how the transitional and the post-transitional political 
narrative in Poland differed, the background to the campaign starting in 2005 and 
how the political narrative of the Communist past before the Kaczyńskis tried to 
change it will be discussed now. It will be answered what kind of rhetoric and 
arguments were used before 2005 using public speeches and official statements 
from 1989-2005.  
After 1989, two main narratives prevailed, which Kenneth Burke named the 
“frame of acceptance” and the “frame of rejection”.52 The former is defended by 
post-Communist parties and former servants of the Communist regime and stretch 
the context and social and economic reconstructions as positive aspects of the 
Communist system rather than abuses and wrongdoings. Marian Orzechowski, 
                                                            
49 Walicki (1997): p. 187 
50 Nalepa (2011): p. 10  
51 Stan (2006): p. 2  
52 In: Ornatowski (2011): p. 33 
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Poland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1985-1988 and representative of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party, said:  
“For the creation of the new to succeed, it is necessary to preserve a 
balance between continuity and change. Nobody suggests, that the 
past 45 years in Poland, was a period of only achievements and 
successes. But an equally great exaggeration would be to declare, and 
such voices exist, that it was an unbroken chain of failures, that 
everything up to now – has been unsuccessful and bad.”53 
In short, he maintains that not everything was bad and votes for remembering 
the achievements as well. According to him, people who demonize Communism 
are exaggerating, Further on, he argued that the accomplishment of the  
“political and economic reforms, initiated eight years ago [that is, in 
1981, the year martial law was declared by the Jaruzelski 
government] and presently [that is, with the installation of the non-
communist Mazowiecki cabinet] deepened and accelerated”.54  
Mieczysław Rakowski, the last Prime Minister of the PRL, argued along the 
lines of Orzechowski and claimed that without the martial law announced in 1981 
there would have been no perestroika in the Soviet Union and the democratic 
transition would not have been possible in Poland or anywhere in Eastern 
Europe.55 This narrative is the result of the negotiated, not violent, character of the 
transition, the Roundtable Accords, and makes it easier to represent it 
retrospectively as the outcome intended by the old elite.56 The opposition’s role 
was degraded to being partners or simply followers of the democratic process.57 
The latter narrative, the frame of rejection, was mainly communicated by the 
former political opposition, one representative of which is Bronisław Geremek, 
counselor of the Solidarność and one of the leading negotiators in the Roundtable 
Agreement Talks:  
“One should rather speak, what is the balance of decades of 
consolidating and conserving a system that is contrary to the laws of 
life. One should speak of the injustices [done] to people and wrongs 
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54 In: Ornatowski (2011): p. 34  
55 In: Ornatowski (2011): p. 34  
56 Ornatowski (2011): p. 34 
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[done] to the nation, of the waste of efforts, [of] the alienation of the 
sense of human labour”.58  
Kenneth Burke argues that the narrative that finds itself in the “frame of 
rejection” puts focus on the legitimization of the active and moral opposition to 
the Communist system and defends the viewpoint and memories of those who 
have suffered under it.59  
In short, the Polish political sphere has not experienced any systematic de-
Communization, which has been an inacceptable condition that the Kaczyńskis 
tried to change beginning in 2005, introducing a fifth, post-transitional phase.  
 
 
1.3. The PiS and ‘politics of history’ 
1.3.1. Background  
It was the Kaczyński brothers who had considerable influence on the political 
memory in Poland in the 2000s. They used the term “politics of history” (Polityka 
historyczna), which describes “(…) the conscious attempt to present historical 
events and their narrative in such a way as to strengthen collective identity and a 
sense of national purpose”. Jarosław Kaczyński defined de-Communization as “an 
extension of the restrictions for former employees of the party apparatus”.60 The 
“politics of history” of the Kaczyńskis was explicitly opposed to the so-called 
“policy of micromania”, supposedly promoted by the liberal elites on the other 
side of the political spectrum, according to which the Polish identity deriving 
from their common history is one of humiliation and defeat.61 In other words, the 
PiS’s intention was to re-interpret history that is more comely and strengthens the 
national sense. Another declared aim of the Kaczyńskis was to break with certain 
aspects of the old narrative. A rather prominent example is the change of the 
narrative of the massacre of Katyń. During the 1990s in Poland, political 
declarations, media attention, and academic studies sought to find out the truth 
about massacres committed by the Communists, such as Katyń, Kharkov, and 
Miednoye. This was necessary since the truth was concealed by the Soviets who 
accused the Nazis of having committed the crime. As a consequence, official 
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59 Ornatowski (2011): p. 33  
60 11.01.2007 | Aktualności (News) | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007) | Źródło (Source): PAP. PiS website.  
61 Stanley (2012) 
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cemeteries for victims of those massacres were opened. Especially Katyń is 
memorized as symbol of Soviet evil-ness and, hence, highly mystified. Lech 
Walesa stated in 1995 that “throughout the years of the conspiracy of silence 
surrounding the Katyń crime the Poles had always heard its silent cry”.62 Lech 
Kaczyński stated in 2010 that:  
“Hiding the truth about Katyń - on the decision of those who 
perpetrated it - became a pillar of Communist politics in post-war 
Poland: the foundation myth of the PRL”.63  
Katyń has been a “forbidden historical memory”64 throughout the period of 
Communist rule in Poland.  
However, it must be noted that it was not only the PiS who advocated a fresh 
discourse, the PO also granted memory a relevant position on their agenda 
beginning in 2005, in a less populist manner anyway. The PiS’s official 
motivation to bring the topic back to the Sejm was to “return historical memory to 
the Polish society”65. However, it is not only the memory of the Communist times, 
but also of the transition period that the Kaczyńskis aimed at correcting. They 
argue that both the political memory created in the 1990s and the political 
transition were done in the wrong matter and needed to be revised.66 The 
Kaczyńskis claimed that the Polish political system needs to be cleaned from 
former Communists in order to finalize the democratic transition.67  
There are several possible reasons that could explain why the Kaczyńskis made 
a comparatively late and radical attempt at post-Communist justice. Monika 
Nalepa (2010) argues that they were sure that no one in their own ranks would be 
affected by lustration (“no skeletons in the closet”). The PiS is a non-
collaborating, post-Solidarność party, which means that its representatives can be 
expected not to be former Communist collaborators and, on the contrary, rather 
anti-Communist. It can further be argued that people affected by lustration are 
from the opposition, which provided the PiS with a political competitive 
advantage. They believed that their ideologically motivated fight against 
Communism legitimizes their right to rule in post-Communist Poland. In Poland, 
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63 Euobserver (2010). Translated by Rettmann.  
64 Ricketson (2001): p. 500 
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calls for lustration came from rather small minority groups such as radical right-
wing post-Solidarity groups excluded from the first post-Communist 
government.68 Andrzej Walicki claims that “they needed a spirit of ideological 
crusade and a demonized picture of the enemy”.69 For the supposedly moral 
defenders that proclaimed that any compromise with the post-Communist parties 
was completely unacceptable; it was considered a pact with evil, including a 
betrayal of moral values and an adulteration of national identity.70 Moreover, the 
PiS’s right-wing, anti-Communist ideology and their populist nature demands it. 
Wiktor Osiatyński, among others, argues that it might be motivated by revenge.71 
Valentinas Mite (2007) says that the Kaczyńskis were “driven by resentment 
against an entire generation of older politicians, the Kaczyńskis are happy to see 
them purged from offices and replaced by their own loyalists”. It is commonly 
suggested (e.g. Walicki 1997) that Jarosław Kaczyński was at least partly 
motivated by personal frustration rooting in the conflict with intellectuals such as 
Adam Michnik. Moreover, in the eyes of the Kaczyńskis, “the Round Table 
Agreements appeared not as tremendous victory, (…) but rather as a shameful, 
cowardly deal, bordering on a national betrayal.”72  
Nonetheless, even within the PiS party, there was disagreement on how 
extensive and radical the lustration law should be. The Kaczyński brothers and 
their circle were in favor of maintaining certain limitations, particularly with 
regard to privacy. The younger generation, in contrast, demanded a more radical 
approach to lustration with no restrictions.73 The Kaczyńskis’ reserve can be 
explained with their awareness of legislative constraints. That the younger 
generation was even more drastic in their demands is not surprising considering 
that the Kaczyńskis, when they founded the party in 2001, chose young people on 
the far right as their primary target group.74 Those young, highly ideologically 
motivated, rightists served in the discussion on the new lustration law as agitators 
in order not to seem soft for right-wing oriented voters.  
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1.3.2. Speech and word analysis  
The objectives of the analysis is to examine what kind of image the Kaczyński 
brothers draw of Communist Poland and with which rhetorical tools they attempt 
at creating it. In order to reach these objectives, political documents will be 
quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. The documents were chosen if they met 
the following criteria. According to the directive approach, party programs and 
public statements provided by the PiS and speeches given by the Kaczyńskis that 
dealt with the same policy are suitable for the analysis. They are suitable if they 
include expressive statements on Communism. Keywords such as Communism, 
PRL and lustration were used to separate relevant surveys from irrelevant ones. In 
the Kronika Sejmowa (The parliamentary chronicle), a search for the word 
“Kaczyński” was made. In speeches and statements of them fast search for 
relevant words (context units), which are Komunizm (Communism), 
Dekomunizacja (de-Communization), PRL and lustracja (lustration). After 
stemming they were cut down to “Kommuniz*”, which covered both Communism 
and de-Communization, “PRL” and “lustrac*”. These three terms are part of one 
context unit. They are really general terms, but this can be justified with the very 
broad topic that deals with the general pictures of Communist times and not 
anything more specifics. The second aspect of the summative approach was then 
applied and the context and connotation considered.  
Extracts of speeches, party programs, and public statements will be analyzed 
under these aspects, following the tracks of Lasswell’s communication model: 
What is the type of speech or statement? What is the occasion? Who is it directed 
to – potential voters, fellow politicians, commemoration participants, or others? 
First, the central message of the speech will be outlined. Second, answers to the 
following questions will be given, following the summative approach: What does 
the speaker emphasize in his statement? How are central words connoted? How 
does the speaker contrast aspects to present choices to the listeners? What are the 
major arguments, words, phrases and rhetorical tools used in the speeches? Third, 
all findings will be summarized. Ideological bias is presumed in all documents, 
because they are tools serving a populist, anti-Communist campaign by a center-
right wing political party.   
It is maintained here that yet another phase began in 2005 with the PiS winning 
the parliamentary elections and trying to introduce a more populist anti-
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Communist political memory. Their proclaimed aim was to remove former 
Communists and collaborators from any position of power. Jarosław and Lech 
Kaczyński promoted a new lustration process, whose necessity they mainly 
justified with moral obligation; “jakość moralna” (moral quality)75 and “rewolucja 
moralny” (moral revolution)76 were often used catchphrases. The 2009 PiS Party 
Program says:  
“This [jakość moralna] requires both a fair settlement of the 
communist past and the purification of public life in the Republic of 
degeneration associated with changes in the system after 1989. It is 
not possible to build a democratic Poland with a functioning market 
economy without the strength to overcome the Communist past.”77  
The party program addresses Polish voters and, therefore, it is rhetorically 
considerably strong and aims at influencing the voters’ opinion. “Jakość” is 
defined as a certain degree of perfection.78 “Moralny” in the political context 
means not only moral, but also pure, noble, clean, or decent.79  If the Kaczyńskis’ 
campaign is pure and decent, it is implied in reverse that everything Communist is 
the opposite – impure, dirty, and corrupt.  
As much as the Kaczyński brothers reinvigorated the past, their aim was to put 
an end to the Communist era that was still ruling Poland in their eyes. Lech 
Kaczyński said in 2005 that:  
“Poland absolutely needs to establish a moral order, and this moral 
order also means our efforts to deal with the burden of the past by 
rejecting it. This can be achieved by political screening. Vetting must 
be carried out with all determination”.80  
Lech Kaczyński puts emphasis on the PiS’s claimed moral mission to establish 
morality in Poland by introducing stricter vetting and screening procedures. This 
statement is taken from his inaugural speech given in the Sejm and, thus, directed 
towards parliamentary members (MPs) and fellow politicians. The choices that are 
presented to the listeners are, one, further political screening that leads to a moral 
                                                            
75 PiS Party Program 2009. PiS website.  
76 Puhl (2007) 
77 PiS Party Program 2009. PiS website. The original says: Wymaga to zarówno uczciwego rozliczenia 
komunistycznej przeszłości, jak i oczyszczenia życia zbiorowego w Rzeczypospolitej z wynaturzeń 
towarzyszących zmianom systemowym po 1989 r. Nie da się zbudować demokratycznej Polski ze sprawnie 
działającą gospodarką rynkową bez zdecydowanego przezwyciężenia komunistycznej przeszłości.   
78 Centrum Jakości (2013). The original says: Jakość jest to pewien stopień doskonałości.  
79 Definicja (2002). The original says: Bezgrzeszny, szlachetny, czysty, przyzwoity.   
80 Raimundo (2012): p. 194  
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system or, two, no screening allegedly resulting in the rule of immorality. This 
moral revolution was supposed to be carried out through a new lustration law, the 
so-called purification law.  
According to Jarosław Kaczyński, uncovering the truth or “showing the evil 
communist period is a big task; the further course of events showed how fateful 
the adoption of this method as a true and false in the public consciousness is 
mixed”.81 This statement is directed towards (potential) voters of the PiS. Hence, 
his intention is to demonize (“evil”) Communism and spread this image of the 
past among the people. This particular rhetorical tool is called ethos, which 
describes the means of convincing an audience of an argument by establishing 
oneself as ethical or moral center. His viewpoint is rather undifferentiated and he 
provides, typical for a populist point of view, a rather black and white scheme. He 
suggests that everyone who does not share his perception of Communism is 
misguided. In other words, the choices that he is presenting to the audience are 
condemning Communism and being right or disagreeing with him and being blind 
for the truth. Kaczyński claims to fulfill a higher purpose and serves fate 
(“fateful”). He exaggerates in order to legitimize the anti-Communist witch-hunt. 
The PiS claims the monopoly on who is Communist and how Communism should 
be remembered and perceived: “Restore historical memory, we will show who 
was who. Recall, what the essence of Communism and the PRL is”.82 Again, the 
addressee is the Polish population in general.  
Another catchword was “pakt”, which translates into “the pact”. According to 
the Kaczyńskis, the pact was the network of Communists ruling the Third 
Republic that allegedly still exists. They claim that post-1989 Poland is still ruled 
by a conspiratorial clique consisting, for the most part, of the old apparatchiks. 
Old alliances and networks survived the transition and explain the success of 
people, who understood to translate their former political connections into 
business contacts.83 According to the interpretation of the Kaczyńskis, the 
Communist system was not a system with rules but viewed instead as system of 
personal connections.84 In their rhetoric, the pact is made responsible for 
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82 31.10.2006 | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007). 365 dni realizacji programu Solidarnego Państwa (365 days 
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everything that goes wrong in Poland.85 The term “pakt” in the political sense is 
connoted quite negatively. It describes being concluded with an ally or even 
agreeing to a devil's offer.86  
A considerable reason for the PiS’s electoral success in 2005 was that they said 
the root of the corruption problem in Poland is the pact and the system infiltrated 
with corrupted Communists. Jarosław Kaczyński said in 2006 in a speech given in 
parliament:  
“A ruthless and, until recently, very effective defense mechanism 
employed in maintaining the status quo also with regard to those who 
had smoothly been transferred from the old regime to the new, without 
any ‘lustration’ whatsoever. (…) Members of that [Olszewski] 
government did not comfort themselves with the naive belief that after 
1989 a miracle occurred in Poland and the old state apparatus 
suddenly became the apparatus of a democratic state (…) We shall 
fight against that [the pact]. We want to destroy it. We want to use 
legal methods, the methods appropriate for a country that believes in 
the rule of law. Our first goal is to discredit that network as 
immoral”.87   
Words referring to the supposedly moral obligation as justification for a more 
severe lustration reoccur considerably often. The repetitiveness of morality as 
single argument for their campaign shows the lack of other legitimizing 
arguments. The electoral success of the PiS can, hence, be explained with their 
promise to fight corruption and not with their radical approach towards former 
Communists, since it was not a priority in the previous electoral campaigning. 
According to Raimundo (2012: 173), the PiS electoral manifesto of 2005, called 
‘Justice for all’, was one of the few documents that showed the rather radical 
attitude of the PiS towards Communists and the Communist past. The PiS’s 
victory rooted in their ability to use the transition anxieties and disappointments of 
some parts of the population. Then, in the following years of 2005, de-
Communization and lustration became major parts of the new political agenda. 
The PiS’s Party Program 2009 stated:  
“Therefore, the need to constantly preach de-communization, or 
actual abolition of the former communist nomenklatura privileges and 
liquidation of informal social networks in the Third Republic created 
by people who were associated with the Communist Party apparatus 
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86 Definicja (2002). The original says: Zawierany z sojusznikiem. Oferta czarcia do zawarcia. 
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and its subordinate special services, the obvious foreign connections. 
We stand for vetting, defined as the disclosure of potential links with 
departments playing an important role in social and public life in free 
Poland.”88  
“Potential links” indicates a presumption of guilt. In the eyes of the Kaczyńskis 
everyone is suspicious of being involved in the former Communist network. The 
nomenklatura includes, according to the Kaczyńskis, all those people who wanted 
to enrich themselves while continuing to rule the country indirectly behind the 
scenes.89 The voter is given the choice between being ruled by mafia-like cliques 
aiming at their own profit and the rule of the PiS that promises the end of 
corruption.  
This is the reason why scholars like Nalepa (2011: 10) call the Kaczyński’s 
new attempt at lustration a “witch-hunt”. The Kaczyńskis belong to those 
politicians for whom evil had to appear in the shape of post-Communist 
politicians. The PiS provided their plan of how Communists and the Communist 
should ideally be dealt with in the 2009 party program under the section called 
‘Truth in public life’:  
“A nation that has no memory cannot normally grow. During the last 
two decades of efforts to "amputate" the memory of the Polish nation 
dealt with both our post-war history and earlier periods. After 
winning the election, we review the legislation establishing the scope 
of the various types of classified information, as well as rules 
preventing non-citizens' access to the secret information held by 
public bodies, removing any unnecessary restrictions. After 1989, a 
kind of state secret conspiracy of silence and trying to surround the 
sphere of knowledge about the mechanisms of oppression of the 
Nation and society by Communism and the people who participated in 
such activities. Prohibitions and obstacles created by a kind of "front 
of national censorship", made up of influential politicians, journalists, 
lawyers, etc., and unworthy of ways to discredit individuals and 
institutions to know the truth do not have counterparts in other 
countries of our culture. Fear of elites against disclosure of the truth 
about important public issues can occur, as it turns out, not only in 
totalitarian systems. In our opinion, the only justification for the 
restrictions may be to protect the data on health and family life and 
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intimate are officially communist repression and surveillance, or the 
sake of the current security requirements of an independent state.”90  
In short, the PiS voted for a so-called Truth and Justice Commission, extending 
lustration to journalists, opening all files of all public officials, revealing all 
functionaries and collaborators, and lustration of politicians and their families. All 
these aims are summarized in the “Memory and responsibility Program” of the 
PiS, which is part of the 2005 Party Manifesto. The key words here are: 
amputation of memory, conspiracy of silence, censorship, and disclosure of the 
truth. The PiS evokes certain fears of the Polish voters. Pathos is a rhetorical tool 
that aims at persuading an audience by appealing to emotions such as pity, guilt, 
anger, or love. In this case, the Kaczyńskis try to evoke anger and a feeling of 
being treated unfairly among the Polish population. They predict that democratic 
liberties are taken away (“censorship”), the Polish society is being lied to 
(“disclosure of the truth, conspiracy of silence”) and others brutally and 
illegitimately taking away something that belongs to them (“amputation of 
memory”). Differently speaking, the voters can decide between the continuation 
of totalitarianism and the end of an unfair and suppressive system.  
A more concrete example that is the most emotionally discussed aspect of the 
Communist past. It can be argued that the Kaczyńskis used Katyń in a populist 
matter, since it provokes nationalist, anti-Russian sentiments in Poland. But that is 
not necessary since the political elites agreed on the same narrative of the events. 
Even the post-Communist parties are not ideologically blinded in that matter. The 
SLD representative Jerzy Szmajdzinski expressed in 2010 expectations from the 
Russian government to start an open and honest debate on the dark side of Soviet 
history.91 Another member of the SLD, Ryszard Kalisz said that “Katyń remains a 
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okazuje, nie tylko w systemach totalitarnych. Naszym zdaniem jedynym uzasadnieniem ograniczeń może być 
ochrona danych dotyczących zdrowia oraz życia rodzinnego i intymnego ofi ar komunistycznych represji i 
inwigilacji lub wzgląd na aktualne wymogi bezpieczeństwa niepodległego państwa.  
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tragic place for Poles”.92 Lech Kaczyński said in his last speech in 2010 on Katyń 
before he anticipated attending a commemoration ceremony:  
“Over 21,000 Polish prisoners were in April 1940 taken from the 
NKVD's [the Soviet secret police] camps and prisons and murdered. 
This crime of genocide was perpetrated by the will of Stalin, on the 
orders of the highest authorities of the Soviet Union. The alliance of 
the Third Reich, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the aggression 
against Poland of 17 September 1939 culminated in the shocking 
Katyn crime”.93  
The speech was directed towards the public in general and family members of 
victims in particular. Further on, they promoted the removal of all Communist 
signs and put them on the same level as Nazi symbols. Jarosław Kaczyński said:  
“Communism was a genocidal system that led to the murder of tens of 
millions of people. No symbol of communism has a right to exist in 
Poland, because these are symbols of a genocidal system that should 
be compared to German Nazism”.94  
“Politicians from [the PiS and the PO] have said that, because more people 
died under communism than under fascism, the law is justified (…) so far no one 
has published an official list of exactly which symbols are outlawed. Critics have 
complained that the law is too hazy to actually be applied”.95 The comparison of 
Communism in Poland and National Socialism in Germany may be inaccurate, yet 
expresses the radical attitude of the Kaczyński brothers. It can be doubted, though, 
that the majority of the Polish population supported these radical stances. Jerzy 
Jedlicki put it this way: “Such comparisons, trivializing Auschwitz and Treblinka, 
are, in my view impermissible. In this question I have behind me a majority of the 
enlightened public opinion in Europe”.96 It, however, supports the democratic 
narrative, according to which the transition was a political liberation from an 
oppressive, illegitimate, totalitarian system to a democratic one, hard-won through 
years of popular struggle.97 Jarosław Kaczyński went as far as to call it a monster:  
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“It is plain that a post-communist state has arisen in Poland, a post-
communist monster so to speak. A monster in which the social 
dominance, obtained by the nomenklatura, very quickly turned into 
political dominance and paved the way to their return to power”.98  
Jarosław Kaczyński is convinced that:  
“They obviously are guilty, we are in favor of vetting, as this would 
not absolve these people but on the other hand those most guilty of 
being in the background and do not bear any consequences of their 
actions. In short, we want to hit hard”.99  
Those words directed towards the voters are supposed to show the strength and 
the PiS’s commitment to fight against the criminal and the bad, embodied by the 
(ex-) Communists. Lech Kaczyński proclaimed that “Communism in Poland fell 
on September 12, 2005, the day PiS won the elections“.100 Jarosław Kaczyński 
found strong words to describe the (post-Communist) opposition:  
“We are dealing with an unprecedented bastardization of the political 
and cultural establishment. These are the people who came out of 
Communism with a variety of deep-hidden complexes by their own 
fault. (...) Our unfortunate peripherals, imitative, mimic elite believe 
that they cannot escape moral arguments”.101  
The repetitive theme of moral monopoly versus immoral and quite despicable 
nature of Communism is illustrated here. The words used here do not serve a 
political purpose anymore, but, instead, seem to be expressions of a deeply rooted 
detestation (“imitative, mimic elite”).  
To sum up, the analysis included three aspects: quotation, description and 
interpretation. The objective of the analysis is to examine how Communism is 
presented and what kind of picture of Communist Poland is drawn by the PiS in 
general and the Kaczyński brothers in particular. The Kaczyńskis demonize the 
Communist regime (PRL) and argue that the Polish state is not yet fully 
democratized and parts of the former corrupt and totalitarian system have 
prevailed. The words and phrases that the Kaczynskis use the most are the 
                                                            
98 Raimundo (2012): p. 188  
99 11.01.2007 | Aktualności (News) | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007) | Źródło (Source): PAP. PiS website.  
100 Rosiak (2006). The original says: Komunizm w Polsce upadł 12 września 2005, czyli w dniu, w którym PiS 
wygrał wybory.  
101 Kublik (2012). The original says: Mamy do czynienia z niebywałym skundleniem polityczno-kulturowego 
establishmentu. To są ludzie, którzy wyszli z komunizmu z różnymi głęboko ukrytymi kompleksami własnych win 
(...) Nasze nieszczęsne peryferyjne, naśladowcze, małpiarskie elity uważają, że nie uchodzi używać argumentów 
moralnych. In: “The Poland of our dreams” (2011).  
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negatively connoted terms “moral quality” and “pact”. Moreover, they present 
themselves as single alternative, as the only ones who can put a definite end to it.  
 
 
1.4. The polish society and ‘politics of history’  
The aim of this section is to answer the following questions: Is the Communist 
past still relevant for the Polish public and if so, to what extent? Has public 
perception of the Communist era radicalized due to the PiS’s campaign? Was the 
Kaczyńskis’ proclaimed aim to change the perception of the Communist times 
successful? The three following outcomes are possible. Either the population has 
become increasingly indifferent towards the Communist past or they considered 
the Kaczyński rhetoric to be too radical and inappropriate. Or lastly, they are 
influenced by the campaign and the radicalization of the political memory has led 
to a new social narrative. In order to measure the impact survey data from before 
and during the Kaczyński era will be compared. Data from 1994, 2002, 2005, and 
2009 seem suitable, because they show the development before, during and after 
the rule of the Kaczyńskis and cover a timeframe that permits to make a reliable 
statement about observable trends and changes in the public opinion.  
 
1.4.1. Nostalgia  
Political nostalgia never actually prevailed in Poland; no political party, not 
even the post-Communist ones like the SLD, suggests the return to a Communist 
or socialist system. On the social level, in contrast, nostalgic sentiments among 
some Poles have evolved over the past decade. Leszek Koczanowicz (2008: 8) 
claims that post-Communist nostalgia in Poland depends largely on political 
and/or economic disappointments and problems and does not necessarily derive 
from a genuine longing for the PRL era. According to Christine Esche (2013), it is 
particularly the older generation and the more rural population that sees the 
Communist past with certain sentimentalism. Karolina Slovenko (2007) argues 
that sentimentality developed, especially among elderly people, due to a number 
of economic, social and political disappointments in the new, democratic system 
following the PRL. Most people miss the social cohesion and equality, cheap 
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health care, lack of security that the old regime had provided. Particularly old 
Poles feel politically stigmatized, suffer the loss of their identity, and experience 
economic disadvantages. Seeing exclusively the negative sides of the past would 
mean to take away positive things from many years of one’s own life. Tadeusz 
Puczkowski (2009) states that “[i]t was bad, but it was bad for everybody”. 
Puczkowski is expressing his opposition to the narrative of the Kaczyńskis by 
claiming that people growing up in the PRL are today in the firing line of 
politicians since they are considered part of the old system. This is where the 
political stigmatization originates from: “People think if the times were bad, the 
people living then were also bad” (Niczke, 2009). Justyna Kopczynska argues that 
although young people in Poland know that the Communist government was 
repressive, they are reviving it now is more about freedom and personal style.102 
Yet, the narrative among young people differs from the older ones. Communism 
is for them is more a fashionable trend, rather than a political system. Among 
young people Communism has become an apolitical fashion source. Fruzsina 
Müller (2007) writes in: “Retro Fashion, Nostalgia and National Consciousness” 
that “it is important to know that there is not only personal nostalgia but also a 
collective one”. According to Dr. Duda (2009) young people cannot feel 
nostalgic, because they do not have active memories of the Communist era: “For 
young people, (…) you cannot really call it nostalgia, because for nostalgia you 
have been living in the times”. Yet, what can be said against this argument is that 
by seeing images in the public sphere, it is possible for many members of society 
to feel nostalgia for times of which they did not have any personal experiences.103 
Further on Müller argues that the “development of collective nostalgia is very 
likely when personal lifelines are crossed by a large historical event or sudden 
change in society that evokes similar fears or answers in the people”.  
Generally speaking, rather diffuse opinions and relations dominate among the 
Poles when it comes to their Communist past. Although a certain trend towards 
nostalgia cannot be denied, the Polish collective memory of the Communist past 
is predominantly negatively associated with “long lines, political prisoners, 
censorship, poverty, martial law, cruelty, absurdity, and misery”.104 In the social 
                                                            
102 Voice of America (2009) 
103 Müller (2007) 
104 Esche (2013) 
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narrative, Communism is mostly reduced to ridiculousness and shabbiness, taking 
pride in strength of both the people and Solidarity.105  
 
 
1.4.2. Trends in Polish public opinion of the Communist past 
In the following section, the survey data collected by CBOS will be presented 
and evaluated in order to measure tendencies and changes in the Polish population 
concerning the Communist past. The Polish society is divided between people 
with a positive and those with a negative view of Communist Poland. According 
to Ryszard Stemplowski (2010), it is mostly young people who have a negative 
attitude, whereas elder Poles tend to have good memories of that time.106 A 
possible explanation that is suggested here is that the people growing up in the 
Communist era were, to a certain extent, affected by the Communist propaganda 
and ideology.  
 
LIFE IN THE PRL COMPARED TO NOW  
The first survey that will be discussed here investigates the public’s 
opinion of the political and economic transition of Poland. Have the changes 
taking place in Poland since 1989 brought people more gains or losses? In 1994, a 
majority of the respondents (42%) thought the changes had brought more losses 
than gains. For 32% the transition caused about the same amount of losses and 
gains. Only 15% of the interviewees saw the positive things resulting from the 
events in 1989. Compared to 1997, the general attitude towards the transition 
period was more positive, with 22% of the questioned persons claiming that they 
were better off before 1989 than after. For 40% losses and gains kept the balance. 
A quarter of the interviewees experienced more gains than losses. 13% had no 
opinion on that. Only one year later, in 1998, most of the respondents’ view on the 
political, economic and social changes affirmative. The majority (32%) chose 
answer a), in comparison to 27% who answered with c). 31% said that there has 
been the same number of gains and losses after 1989.  
 
 
                                                            
105 Esche (2013)  
106 Stemplowski (2010): p. 327 
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Graph 1: Did the post-1989 transformation bring more costs or benefits?  
 
Data source: CBOS (2009) 
 One can see on the graph that over the years the opinions on whether the 
regime change in 1989 brought more gains or losses altered significantly between 
the years of 1994 and 2009. The number of people in favor of the transition 
increased largely between 2004 and 2009. Whether or not this is due to the 
Kaczyńskis’ campaign is difficult to evaluate. Other possible explanations are the 
membership to the European Union in 2004 that brought various political, 
economic and also social benefits that are only possible in a democratic Poland.  
 The second question included in the survey was: In what way have the 
following changed since 1989: a) Our relations with other countries, b) Polish 
economy, c) politics, d) relations between the authorities and people? Generally 
speaking, the numbers indicate that the vast majority of respondents saw 
advancement in all categories. 76% were convinced that relations with other 
countries had improved since the collapse of the Communist regime, compared to 
3% who thought that relations had deteriorated. 7% did not identify any change. 
Concerning the Polish economy, 61% observed an enhancement, 9% noticed no 
change, and 23% thought it was taking a turn to the worse. In the political context, 
people tended to see the situation ameliorating (51%). 17% disagreed with them. 
16% were rather neutral. 26% did not remark changes and 17% claimed that the 
situation has degraded. When it came to relations between the authorities and the 
people, the interviewees were less opinionated. 41% of the polled assessed an 
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augmentation in that matter. More saw a decline in the relations between officials 
and the people (26%) than no change at all (22%).  
 
Graph 2: In what way have politics changed since 1989? 
 
Source: CBOS (1998) 
 
When it came to relations between the authorities and the people, the 
interviewees were less opinionated. 41% of the polled assessed an augmentation 
in that matter. More saw a decline in the relations between officials and the people 
(26%) than no change at all (22%).  
 
Graph 3: In what way have the relations between the authorities and the people 
changed since 1989? 
 
Source: CBOS (1998) 
 
EVALUATION OF THE PRL 
Over the years, the general attitude towards the PRL has largely remained the 
same. In 2000, 47% remembered the PRL period in a negative light compared to 
44%, who have (rather) good memories of that era. In 2009, however, slightly 
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more people had a positive attitude (44%) towards the PRL than a negative one 
(43%). If the political and economic context is considered, this change in 
perception can easily be explained. With the economic crisis hitting Europe in 
2008 and after the enthusiasm about EU membership turned more and more into 
skepticism, the ‘good old times’ appeared to be more appealing. So far, it seems 
like the radicalization of the political narrative towards anti-Communism runs 
counter the development of the social narrative. Popular views on the time of the 
PRL are illustrated on the following graph.  
 
Graph 4: Evaluation of the PRL (data comparison of 2000 and 2009) 
 
Data source: CBOS (2009) 
 
The percentage of people answering with ‘rather good’ decreased slightly. The 
most severe drop was measured in responses ‘rather bad’ and definitely bad. 
Solely the number of people answering with ‘definitely good’ increased. This data 
can be interpreted in the way that the Kaczyńskis might have had a slight effect on 
the society’s view of the PRL, which became a bit more negative.  
  
LUSTRATION 
Since the end of Communist rule in Poland, the Polish society discusses the 
question of how to deal with people who had served the Communist regime. The 
topic reached public attention with the Kaczynskis’ campaign, because the core of 
it was an amended, more radical lustration law. In 1997, a lustration law was 
introduced and has since then been expanded several times. The Institute of 
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National Remembrance (INP) disclosed a list of those who had collaborated with 
the special services. Subsequently, the support for vetting increased measurably 
among the Poles afterwards. The Polish society is divided into supporters and 
critics of lustration in general and the lustration law of 2006 in particular. But also 
Poles supporting the idea of vetting, disagree on the extent and scope of it. The 
two positions can be summarized as follows. The ones against argue that “existing 
laws are sufficient. We should have limited ourselves to [vetting] people who hold 
public office -- MPs, ministers, directors who pursue national interests”.107 The 
ones, among whom is Kaminski, in favor say that Poland still has “(…) problems 
with our past. This past is not finished yet. There are some problems with former 
security officers, with former agents, some unknown links between them; there 
are some problems in politics, in economy (related to the former security 
services). People have the right to know who was a traitor and who [was not]”.108  
The public opinion is running overwhelmingly against the radical nature of the 
extended lustration law and against the style of the Kaczyński government 
itself.109 Moreover, as Adam Czarnota argues, the target of lustration law 
introduced by the Kaczyńskis differs from the aim that the Polish public 
pursues.110 Whereas the lustration law is supposed to provide security of the state 
and the elimination of potential political blackmail, Poles hope for the realization 
of justice. However, there still is reason to argue that the new lustration law is the 
result of public demand. The majority is in favor of lustration. The approval has 
been particularly high in the years of 1997 (78%) and 2005 (68%). Disapproval 
was most common in 1994 (38%) and 1999 (30%). 58% have agreed to lustration 
throughout the years. The height in consent (~50%) was in 1997, after the first 
lustration law was implemented. 
 
Table 1: Which of the following groups should be included in the lustration 
process? 
Who should be affected by lustration? % of Poles in favor 
Premier & deputy premiers  85 
Ministers & deputy ministers 85 
Parliamentary deputies & senators 84 
                                                            
107 Mite (2007) 
108 Mite (2007) 
109 Komorowsky (2007) 
110 In: Duthie (2007): p. 30  
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Senior public officials 82 
Judges & procurators 82 
Diplomatic service employees 79 
Local council members 65 
Public TV & radio journalists 51 
Teachers  36 
Source: CBOS (1997) 
 
VETTING AND DE-COMMUNIZATION 
The surveys on vetting and de-Communization seem relevant, because, as 
Szczerbiak (2003) argues, the attitudes towards the Communist era play an 
important role in determining voting behavior among Poles. Hence, radical 
attitudes towards vetting and de-Communization most likely lead to self-
placement on the right side of the political spectrum, which is reflected in the 
party of choice in elections. Approval of or opposition to the Kaczyńskis can, 
therefore, be read from the data base.  
As mentioned before, almost a quarter of the Polish population is not opposed 
to granting former Communist civil servants positions in the new democratic 
state. The majority of the Poles think that vetting should be performed. There 
were ups and downs in approval rates between 1994 and 2005, but all in all, they 
answered with definitely yes. Those who responded with ‘definitely no’ never 
exceeded 15%. In May 1999, CBOS found that 53% of respondents supported 
removing from public office those who had admitted to past collaboration with the 
security services (23% were against). Correspondingly, a PBS survey from 
September 1999, 52% of all Poles felt that lustration should advance, in 
comparison to 27% who consider it unnecessary.111 In October that year, CBOS 
found a majority (52% to 33%) agreeing with the proposition that anyone who 
was under suspicion of having concealed such links should resign from office 
while their lustration trial was in progress. In 2000 poll conducted as the 
presidential candidates were being lustrated, PBS found that 52% of voters 
viewed the process as essential, while only 36% disagreed.  
 
 
 
                                                            
111 In: Williams, Szczerbiak, Fowler (2003): p. 15  
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Graph 5: Should vetting be performed in Poland now? 
 
Data source: CBOS (2005) 
When it comes to de-Communization, the Polish society is in favor of de-
Communization affecting former party officials and members of the Special 
Services. Poles were asked whether persons occupying high positions in the 
former Communist Party and officers of the Communist Special Services should 
be excluded from public service in the government, local government, foreign 
service, state-owned companies and the public media or not? 56% responded with 
yes, whereas 22% denied former Communist officials the right to hold a public 
position.  
Overall, the respondents tended to be in favor of doing background checks of 
state officials to prevent collaborators with the Communist regime to occupy 
relevant positions. In 2005, approval reached its height with 70% of the Poles 
being in favor. The strong increase within a year can be explained with the 
adoption of the Poland’s new Constitution that marked the end of the Communist 
era and finalized the political transition phase.  
The relatively high support for background checks can also be explained with 
the new lustration law that was introduced in 1997. The respondents answering 
with no decreased with the years and reached a low in 1997 with only 12%. The 
number of persons opposed to vetting was highest in 1994 (37%), and in 1999 and 
2002 (31%). The Polish society seems to be in disagreement whether or not and 
what degree people who served the Communist regime should be judged and 
should be accounted for. CBOS argues that the rather negative attitude towards 
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vetting and disclosing identities of collaborators in particular is due to ongoing 
conflicts within the society, inflicted by the politicians. Poles have apparently 
grown weary. Moreover, people seem to find it rather difficult to judge people in 
an adequate matter who were in power at that time. However, Poles generally 
prefer moral evaluations, denunciation and legal punishment. There is still major 
disagreement on the disclosure of the identity of collaborators.  
 
Graph 6: Should background checks of state officials be performed? This 
question was asked in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2005.  
 
Data source: CBOS (2005) 
 
More than three-quarters (76%) of the interviewed Poles were convinced that 
the judgment of the People’s Republic period should stop and should be a matter 
exclusively for historians. Only 18% argued that judgment should continue, 
because it has not been sufficient. Closely connected to the previous question is: 
From today’s perspective, is it possible to fairly judge people in power during the 
People’s Republic period? Close to half of the respondents (48%) regarded it 
rather impossible to judge and 16% were sure that it was definitely impossible. 
Only 31% claimed that it is definitely or rather possible to judge two decades after 
the collapse of the Communist regime.  
People were then asked what judgment should consist in: a) Moral evaluation, 
denouncing what was evil; b) Putting to trial people who broke the law of that 
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time; c) Disclosing identity of collaborators of security service. Most respondents 
voted for a moral evaluation and denunciation of what was ‘evil’ (56%) and 
supported trials against people who broke the law of that time (50%). 43% were in 
favor of disclosing the identity of collaborators with the security service. 26% 
were against a moral evaluation and 33% against putting people to trial. 38% 
voted against disclosing identities.   
It is particularly state officials and politicians that the Polish citizens want to 
know whether or not they were involved in the Communist regime and should 
further be prevented from occupying the same or similar position.    
 
 
1.4.3. Popular responses to the PiS’s campaign 
In this section, some examples of comments from Polish citizens concerning 
the Communist past will be given. Those statements are not meant to be 
representative, considering that they are published on the PiS homepage. 
However, they provide information and insight on what rather right-wing oriented 
Poles think about the topic. Coming back to the three possible effects of the 
Kaczyńskis anti-Communist campaign mentioned in the beginning of the analysis, 
arguments can be found for all of them and will be discussed below.  
Firstly, arguments for the Polish population becoming increasingly indifferent 
will be presented. The generation that does not have active memory of the PRL is 
slowly taking over power and influence. The younger generation’s interest in 
confronting former Communist officials to justice is rather small, because they 
were not immediately affected or victims of the system themselves. Also, other 
issues might be more pressing to the younger generation like, for instance, 
economic challenges, education or social inequality. It can also be argued that the 
Polish society is growing reluctant of constant fights among the political elite. 
Almost a quarter century has passed since the collapse of the PRL, which takes 
away the urgency of the topic. No evidence of can be given through comments 
published on the PiS’s homepage an attitude of indifference.  
Secondly, indications for support and even radicalization of at least some parts 
of the Polish society can be found in the following statements of Polish citizens, 
found on the homepage of the PiS. Rather right-wing oriented Poles have 
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criticized the mildness of de-Communization in Poland. They consider it a 
“condemnable lack of resoluteness, stemming from an incomprehensible 
forgetfulness of past evils and thereby preventing Poland from becoming ‘truly 
Polish’”.112  
Edward from Canada (30/03/2007), for instance, says:  
“As one of those for whom Communism made it impossible to live in 
the PRL and who was forced to make the difficult decision to leave the 
country in 1962, I strongly support the Polish de-Communization of 
the symbols of the criminal system. Let no thieves, like the SLD and 
their comrades in the Communist Party, pour tears over the 
destruction of the "historic symbols." As we know, nowhere in the 
world are monuments with swastikas and streets for famous Nazis. 
Why do there have to be ones for the Stalinists and their 
successors?!”113  
For him, the Nazi and the Communist regime are equally criminal and 
genocidal systems that should be remembered and legally treated in the same way. 
He fully supports the campaign of the Kaczyńskis.  
Stan (24/02/2007) supports the PiS’s campaign and says that “Jarosław 
Kaczyński is right, because many years of lying leftists and liberals led Poland to 
destruction.”114 Stan is in favor of cleaning the system from the Communist past 
in order to restore the Polish system that is free from corruption and lies. 
Stanisław from Canada (21/2/2007) points out the early Communist years when 
people were sent to Soviet forced labor camps, the so-called gulags:  
“Remembering and learning about the tragic fate of young people 
deported to gulags and starving there, killing the best patriots 
liquidation elites and replacing them by a quarter-intellectuals with 
diplomas as "doctors", loutishness and demoralization of the society, 
corrupt every branch of society and the state, the fight against 
                                                            
112 Walicki (1997): p. 185 
113 30.03.2007 | Wywiady (Interviews) | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007) | Źródło (Source): Polskie Radio Pr 
1. Rozmowa z Kazimierzem Michałem Ujazdowskim w „Sygnałach dnia” (Interview with Kazimierz Michal 
Ujazdowski in "Signals of the day"). The original says: Jako jeden z tych, którym komunizm uniemożliwił życie w 
PRLu i zmusił do podjęcia b. trudnej decyzji opuszczenia kraju w 1962 roku, gorąco popieram odkomunizowanie 
Polski z symboli tego zbrodniczego systemu. Niech żadne złodzieje, z SLD i ich towarzysze z PZPR, nie leją łez 
nad niszczeniem "symboli historycznych". Jak nam wiadomo nigdzie na swiecie nie ma pomników ze swastykami 
i ulic dla słynnych hitlerowców. Dlaczego miały by być dla stalinowców i ich następców?!  
114 21.02.2007 | Aktualności (News) | Rząd (Administration) (2005-2007) | Źródło (Source): PAP. Pokazywanie 
zła okresu komunizmu to wielkie zadanie (Show evil communist period is a big task). The original says: Ma 
rację Jarosław Kaczynski, bo wieloletnie kłamstwa lewaków i liberałów prowadziły Polske do zguby.  
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religion, etc., etc., is necessary. Do it by talks, exhibitions, lectures, 
and through the media, the purification of the traitors is a priority.”115  
In his memory, Communism was a system in which cronyism and corruption 
ruled. Stanisław also calls for purification through historical education and the 
media.  
Szymek (21/02/2007): “Showing evil…let’s start with it already. I want to see 
you in the media, from morning to night and every day. (…) It is high time to raise 
awareness.”116 Szymek demands a more radical approach and higher media 
coverage in order to raise historical consciousness.  
Jacek from Canada (11/01/2007) asserts: “In my opinion this should be 
extended to all officers paid by the Communist Party and other extended 
affiliates.”117 Jacek votes to extend the span of people being part of the screening 
and vetting process.  
Wiesław Pilate-Opole (18/01/2007) demands to:   
“Eliminate "security agencies", places of retreat, UB men, esbeks 
[official of the PRL state security] and spies. No one needs them 
because of the so-called protection directives, formed by the scum 
leftist order to give them a "soft" landing; this applies to all the 
services. (…) We are waiting on the move, when will it happen??? 
Also ban the leftist scum. Throw them mercilessly out of all sectors of 
the economy, because they sabotage everything you want to repair, 
change. (…) Cut them out without sympathy.”118  
Wiesław wants to make Communism and everything related to it become 
irreversibly part of the past. He expresses his opposition to protective directives 
that are supposed to prevent the punishment of innocent people. He also votes for 
                                                            
115 Aktualności. 21.02.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Pokazywanie zła okresu 
komunizmu to wielkie zadanie. The original says: Przypominanie i uczenie młodzieży o tragicznym losie 
wywiezionych do gulagów i tam zagłodzonych, mordowaniu najlepszych patriotów, likwidacji elit i zastąpieniu 
ich ćwierć-inteligentami z dyplomami nawet "doktorów", schamieniu i zdemoralizowaniu społeczeństwa, 
skorumpowaniu każdej gałęzi życia społecznego i państwowego, zwalczaniu religii, itd, itd., jest 
KONIECZNOŚCIĄ. Róbcie to przez rozmowy, wystawy, wykłady i poprzez media, których oczyszczenie ze 
zdrajców jest priorytetem. 
116Aktualności. 21.02.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Pokazywanie zła okresu komunizmu 
to wielkie zadanie. The original says: Pokazywanie zła ....., no to zacznijcie wreszcie pokazywać. Chcę Was 
widzieć w mediach od rana do nocy i każdego dnia. (...) Czas najwyższy do uświadamiania społeczeństwa. 
117 Aktualności. Materiał zdjęciowy. 11.01.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Prezentacja 
deklaracji programowej PiS. The original says: Moim zdaniem powinno to również objąć wszystkich płatnych 
funkcjonariuszy PZPR i innych satelickich przybudówek.  
118 Aktualności. Materiał zdjęciowy. 11.01.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Prezentacja 
deklaracji programowej PiS. The original says: Zlikwidować "Agencje ochrony",matecznik,ubowców,esbeków i 
szpicli.One są nikomu nie potrzebne,ponieważ ptrzepisy o tzw.ochronie,powstawały na tej swołoczy lewackiej 
zamówienie,by mieli "miękkie"lądowanie,dotyczy to wszystkich służb. (...) Czekamy na to posunięcie,kidy to 
nastąpi???także na delegalizację lewackiej swołoczy.Wywalić ich bez pardonu z wszelkich dziedzin 
gospodarki,ponieważ sabotują wszystko co chcecie naprawić,zmienić. (...) Ciąć ich bez litośnie.  
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a more radical penalty affecting a wider range of (potential) servants of the 
Communist system.  
Vladimir Kudaj (18/01/2007) alleges that “Despite the rule of PiS we are still 
far away. (…) It would be more desirable to deal with their representatives as 
active in law enforcement and more.”119 For Vladimir, the reinforced lustration 
law and other initiatives of the PiS are not sufficiently far-reaching.  
The previous statements show that the majority of the center-right-wing 
oriented Poles votes for an even more radical lustration process or strongly 
supports the Kaczyńskis’ anti-Communist campaign. It is something they have 
been waiting for a long time.  
Thirdly, it can be argued that the radical campaign of the PiS has the opposite 
effect on the population. There are voices among the Poles interested in the PiS 
who argue that the new lustration law goes too far. They think a further 
radicalization leads to an unjust situation and to further dividing the Polish 
society. For instance, Katarzyna Podkowińska (11/01/2007) declares:  
“Are the PiS politicians going to take revenge on the widows and 
children of former SBs? Because I must admit that these ideas to 
deprive people who often are sick and elderly, without providing them 
any right to defend themselves, without taking into account even 
individual evil that particular person has committed sounds scary. It's 
hard to deny that the communist regime was a bad system that 
destroyed Poland; it did not give opportunities for the individual to 
human beings. On the other hand, if that's what it took 95% of the 
officers of the Interior Ministry PRL (surveillance, wiretaps, 
recruitment agents) justifies such a radical retaliation and deprivation 
often old and sick people to live on? Even more disgusting sound the 
ideas, the victims of that retaliation have become their family. Do the 
widows of the SBs have to respond generously for the evil that 
perhaps one day their husbands did? And no matter what anyone has 
done exactly? Of course we must settle the story of a bygone era. But 
elementary humanity must be kept here.”120  
                                                            
119 Aktualności. Materiał zdjęciowy. 11.01.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Prezentacja 
deklaracji programowej PiS. The original says: Pomimo rządów PiS (...) nam jeszcze daleko.  (...) Bardziej 
pożądanym było by zajęcie się aktywnymi ich przedstawicielami tak w organach ścigania jak i nie tylko.  
120 Aktualności. Materiał zdjęciowy. 11.01.2007 | Aktualności | Rząd (2005-2007) | źródło: PAP. Prezentacja 
deklaracji programowej PiS. The original says: Czy politycy PiSu mają zamiar również mścić się na wdowach i 
dzieciach b. SBków ? Bo przyznam, że te pomysły, aby pozbawiać ludzi nieraz chorych i w podeszłym wieku, nie 
dając przy tym żadnego prawa do obrony, bez uzwględnienia nawet indywidualnego zła, jakie konkretna osoba 
popełniła brzmią przerażająco. Trudno zanegować, że system PRLu był zły, że niszczył Polskę, nie dawał 
możliwości rozwoju poszczególnym jednostkom ludzkim. Z drugiej jednak strony, czy to, czym się zajmowało 95 
% funkcjonariuszy MSW PRL ( inwigilacja, podsłuchy, werbowanie agentów ) usprawiedliwia tak radykalne 
działania odwetowe jak pozbawienie nieraz starych i chorych ludzi środków do życia ? Tym bardziej obrzydliwie 
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Katarzyna is against the anti-Communist sentiments and argues that the policy 
is unfair and would lead to the punishment of innocent people. Moreover, she 
maintains that people did not have a choice and votes against a less judgmental 
and a more humane attitude. Yet, she acknowledges the flaws and crimes caused 
by the Communist regime.  
Generally speaking, the numerous attempts of anti-Communist campaigning 
had the opposite of the intended effect. Instead of supporting the witch-hunt, 
people became increasingly skeptical of the rightness and appropriateness of the 
collective punishment.121 Opinion polls have shown that the majority prefers 
political stability and national reconciliation over a new lustration process.122 For 
most (apolitical) Poles memories of the PRL included both good and bad sides; in 
their eyes it has been corrupt and inefficient, but calling it evil and morally 
condemnable goes too far for most.123 However, generalizations on the topic of 
public reactions to the Kaczyńskis’ campaign can only be made with certain 
limitations due to the ambiguous results that they deliver. Most comments suggest 
that there is still more that needs to be done, others suggest that the campaign is 
too extensive and might run the risk to affect innocent people.  
 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of the paper was to examine the political and rhetorical means through 
which the political party PiS and its leaders Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński 
attempted to change the political narrative of the Communist past and what kind 
of consequences it had on the Polish public perception. This thesis analyzes 
contemporary politics of memory and its effects on public perception. The link 
between political memory narrative and public opinion polls has remained 
unconsidered in previous studies. Since the indicator is not particularly 
expressive, it can only be recommended for further research as minor argument.  
An actor-oriented top-down approach underlies this thesis. This thesis focuses 
solely on politicians as political memory agents, not considering other members of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
brzmią pomysły, gdy ofiarami tegoż odwetu mają stać się ich rodziny. Czy wodwy po SBekach mają odpowiadać 
dzić za zło, które być może kiedyś uczynili ich mężowie ? I to bez względu na to, co kto konkretnie uczynił 
? Trzeba oczywiście rozliczyć historię minionej epoki. Ale zachwajmy tu elementarny humanitaryzm.  
121 Walicki (1997): p. 187 
122 Walicki (1997): p. 187  
123 Walicki (1997): p. 186 
58 
 
the interpretative elite. The analysis was done mainly through political speeches, 
party programs and statistics. Their empirical evaluation is based on a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches to text content analysis. 
The analysis of political speeches provides a valuable insight into how politicians 
use rhetorical tools to influence societal memory and how they seek control over 
the people’s perception and interpretation of the Communist past. Trends and 
possible changes in Polish public opinion can be observed by means of nation-
wide statistics from the CBOS, conducted repeatedly over the course of 15 years, 
between 1994 and 2009. A noteworthy aspect of the methodological approach is 
the application of comments of citizens to validate arguments on Polish public 
perceptions. Comments from Polish citizens allow insight into actual opinions and 
helps representing the diversified and wide-ranging opinions concerning the 
Communist past.  
The speech analysis revealed that the Kaczyńskis’ anti-Communist campaign 
was justified by moral fight against the corrupt, former Communist network that 
has survived the PRL. The image of the Communist past shaped by the PiS was 
one of a corrupt system, ruled by a group of few – the nomenklatura and 
comparable to the Nazi regime in its genocidal nature. Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński argued that unless Poland is free from Communist structures, that 
allegedly have prevailed, Poland will remain a corrupted, undemocratic system. 
The black-and-white-scheme that became apparent in the Kaczyńskis’ speeches 
suggested that who is not on their side, is a Communist and, hence, suspicious. 
The words and phrases that occurred most often were morality, pact, and 
nomenklatura. The main rhetorical tools included ethos by claiming moral 
supremacy and pathos by evoking feelings of anger.  
The analysis of the effects of the Kaczyńskis’ anti-Communist campaign on the 
social narrative of the Communist past was more ambiguous than the speech 
analysis and led to mixed results. The Polish society reacted very differently to the 
radicalization of the political narrative. The opinion spectrum ranges from support 
to rejection. The Polish society is as divided by their attitude towards the PRL as 
is the Polish political elite. The campaign has intensified the memory cleavage 
that runs along the lines of age, political affiliation and historical awareness 
existing in the Polish society since the end of the PRL. There are people who are 
in favor of vetting and de-Communization and there are those who argue that the 
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PiS’s campaign is a cynical and unjustified witch-hunt. Whereas for older and 
right-wing oriented Poles attached value to the topic, younger and rather moderate 
Poles consider the issue part of the past. With a new generation coming up, 
however, the topic becomes less and less relevant, if not, at least less emotional. 
Political memory has become more radical under the rule of the PiS, but the 
Polish population has not, at least not in the same pace. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the public perception of the Communist era has not radicalized due 
to the PiS’s campaign and the hypothesis, according to which it can be expected 
that the interest in the topic is likely to deteriorate among politicians as well as in 
the society, can only partly be confirmed. Parts of the society have become 
reluctant, but the campaign had an effect by starting a series of new debates 
among politicians. It can be stated that the aim of the campaign, which was 
changing the social perception of Communist Poland, was not reached. The 
Kaczyńskis did not cause institutional changes, e.g. the lustration law was not 
implemented. By taking it too far the PiS party “has killed lustration in 
Poland”.124  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
124 Raimundo (2012): p. 177 
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